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MEMORANDUM TO THE MEMBERS OF THE FORMER AD HOC 
COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES 
In order to keep you continuously informed on developments in the wake of the 
Committee's report last fall, Judge Clark has asked me to transmit the following 
materials reflecting recent events: 
1. A resolution adopted by the Conference of C:!iJef Justices at 
their meeting earlier this month, supporting the proposal of the Ad 
Hoc Committee, urging enactment of the pending bill embodying it 
(S. 1760), and opposing the majority report of the American Bar 
Association Criminal Justice Section on the basis that it ''would 
effectively increase rather than reduce delay in capital cases." 
2. A proposed resolution transmitted to the Chief Justice last week 
by Judge Lay with the signatures of seven other Judicial Conference 
members, which states that it "endorses the essential objectives of 
the Powell Committee Report" but with certain. modifications as 
enumerated in the proposed resolution. 
The Ad Hoc Committee's report remains on the agenda of the Judicial 
Conference for its next scheduled meeting on March 13. 
Attachments 




HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES 
WHEREAS. the Conference of Chief Justices has long supported 
legislation that would place reasonable limits on 
federal habeas corpus review of state convictions, 
including capital cases; and, 
WHEREAS, abuse of , the writ encouraged by present practices 
places heavy burdens on the resources of both etate 
and federal courts and has effectively negated the 
law of the 37 states that impose the death penalty; 
and, 
WHEREAS, the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in 
Capital Cases of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States (the Powell Committee) has proposed 
amendments to federal habeas procedures that would 
promote finality in capital cases without jeopard-
izing the rights of persons with a colorable claim 
of factual innocence; and, 
WHEREAS, legislation to implement the report of the Ad Hoc 
Committee has been introduced in the U.S. Senate 
as S.1760, 
NOW. THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Conference of Chief 
Justices supports enactment of S.1760 and opposes 
proposals such as S.1757 and the majority report of 
the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section 
that would effectively increase rather than reduce 
delay in capital cases. 
Proposed by the Conference of Chief Justices State-Federal 
Relations Committee at the 13th Midyear Meeting in San Juan, 
Puerto Rico on February 1, 1990. 
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February 8, 1990 
The Honorable William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice 
The Supreme Court of the United states 
1 First Street, NE 
Washington, o.c. 20543 
Re: Powell Committee Repcrt - Habeas Corpus Retorm Act 
Dear Mr. Chief Justice: 
Several weeks ago , a cross-aeetional steering committee was 
organized among members of the Judicial Conference to attempt to 
work out some type or resolution which would endorse the essential 
aspects of the Powell Comll'littee Report with slight moditications. 
The steering committee respectfully request• that this resolution 
be placea on t.~e agenda of tha Judicial ccnfar~nce fo r aiscussion 
and vote. The resolution is being circularized to all members of 
the Conference. The primary goal of the 1teering committee is to 
see it we can reach agreement on adequate language which could be 
basically endorsed by the Conference as a whole. The purpose in 
circularizing this in advance is to see if we can avoid any debate 
or controversy over any of the provisions. We have not attempted 
to work out specific language but simply address certain area 
subject matters. 
We -hope everyone will review our proposal with the 
understanding that the committee ia simply trying in good faith to 
reach an agreement that will basically endorse the original Powell 
Committee Report with alight modifications. we would appreciate· 
any further suggestions or amendments. 
If you have any questions concerning the report, I hope you 
will feel free to write to me or any member of the ateerinq 
committee. 
Sincerely yours, 
DONALD P. LAY 
DPL/ja 
cc: Hon. Patricia M. Wald 
cc: Hon. James L. Oakes 
cc: Hon. A Leon Higginbotham, Jr. 
cc: Hon. Alfred T. Goodwin 
cc: Hon. William J. Holloway, Jr. 
cc: Hon. Frank A. Kaufman. 
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RESOLUTION 
IN RE: POWELL AO HOC COMMITTEE ON HABEAS CORPUS 
INVOLVING CAPITAL CASES 
P.3 
The Judicial Conference of the united. States endorses the 
essential objectives ot the Powell Committee Ad Hoc Report on 
federal habeas corpus review or capital cases: 
(l) to eliminate piecemeal appeals: 
(2) to provide an automatic stay in capital cases 
in order to obviate • uocessive petitions for 
stay; and 
(3) to provide competent counsel on state post-
conviction cases. 
The Judicial Conterence endorses the recommendations ot the 
Powell Committee Report aubject to the following modifications: 
A. Because many ot the delays in habeas corpus procedures are 
related to the fact that the defendant was not represented lly 
competent counsel at the trial level (as well as in the state post-
conviction proceedings), specific mandatory atandards similar to 
those set torth in the Anti-Oruq Abuse Act of 1988 should be 
required with respect to the appointment and compensation ot 
counsel tor capital defendants at all stages of the state and 
federal capital punishment litigation. 
Upon the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 
the federal court the court should first determine whether the 
specific guidelines for competent counsel were followed in the 
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state proceedings. If the court determines that competent counsel 
was appointed in the state proceeding•, the • ame counsel should be 
appointed in the federal court, wherever possible. If the court 
determines that competent counsel was not appointed in the • tate 
proceedings, the federal di•trict court ahould appoint new counsel 
under the governing guidelines. In the latter case, the federal 
court should not require dismissal of non-exhausted 1tate claims, 
or apply any procedural default rules or the rule governing the 
presumption ot correctness of state court findings of fact. 
CO!I.J!!lNTllY 
The present proposal of the Powell Committee provides states 
with the option to set standards ot competency for the appointment 
of counsel in state post-conviction cases. 'l'his proposal has 
serious drawbacks. Providing atatea the option to • et and comply 
with the standards will lead to the creation of different and 
inconsistent standards among tha atataa and will result in two sets 
of procedures in tederal post-conviction cases: one tor 
petitioners from states that have opted to adopt atandards and 
another for petitioners from atatea that do not. The result would 
be confusion and a proliteration of litigation. We thus endorse 
t he ABA Task Force recommendation ot one mandatory national 
standard governing competent counsel. 
-2-
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B. The Conference endorses the following recommendation of 
the ABA Task Force, except a\lbatitutinq the language at the 
conclusion of thia paragraph for the phrase "result in a 
miscarriage ot justice. n· 
Federal courts should not rely on •tat• procedural bar 
rules to preclude consideration ot the merit• of a claim 
if the prisoner shows that th• failure to raise the claim 
in a state court was due to the ignorance of the 
prisoner, or the neglect or ignorance of counsel, or if 
the failure to consider auch a claim would undermine the 
court's confidence in the jury'• determination ot guilt 
on the offense or offensea for which the death penalty 
was imposed, or in the appropriateness of the sentence 
of death. 
c. The Conference supports the essential features of the ABA 
Task Force recommendat~on concerning aecond or successive petitions 
tor habeas relief. The Conference does, however, favor and endorse 
a change in that recommendation • o that it be clear that it 
supports a federal court entertaining a aecond or successive 
petition on the grounds • tated in the ABA Task Force 
recommendation, but in addition stating that any statutory revision 
would include a proviso that •uch a successive or second petition 
be entertained where the fact•, it proven, would undermine the 
court's confidence also in "the appropriatenesa of the sentence of 
death." In order to make this clear within the context ot the ABA 
Task Force recommendation, the Conference supports the following 
modified recommendation: 
A federal court should entertain a second or successive 
petition for habeas corpus relief ifi the request for 
relief is based on a claim not previously presented by 
the prisoner in the state and federal courts and the 
-3-
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failure to raise the claim ia the result of state action 
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 
States, the result of Supreme Court recognition of a new 
federal right that is retroaotivaly applicable, or based 
on a tactual predicate that could not have been 
discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence; 
or the tacts underlying the claim would be sufficient, 
it proven, to undermine the court•• confidence in the 
jury•• determination of quilt on the ottenae or offenses 
~or which the death penalty was imposed, or in the 
appropriateness ot the sentence ot death. 
P.6 
D. The federal statute ot limitation& •hould commence upon 
the conclusion ot all direct atate appeals and state post-
conviction proceedings, and after the date of judgment on petitions 
for certiorari timely filed after the final •tate court decision 
on post-conviction relief. Tha federal statute of limitations 
should be one year following the conclusion ot proceedings as 
specified herein. 
E. The Judicial Conterence adopts the following 
recommendation of the ABA Task Force: 
The standard for deterxnining whether changes in federal 
constitutional law should apply retroactively should be 
whether failure to apply the new law would undermine the 
court's confidence in the jury•• detennination o! guilt 
on the offense or ottensea tor which the death penalty 
was imposed, or in the appropriateness of the sentence 
ot death. 
Respectfully proposed, 
Hon. Patricia M. Wald 
Hon. James L. Oakes 
Hon. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. 
Hon. Sam J. Ervin, III 
Hon. Oonald P. Lay 
Hon. Altred T. Goodwin 
Hon. William J. Holloway, Jr. 
Hon. Frank A. Kaufman 
_,_ 
/ ~ 
Southern Prisoners' Defense Committee 
185 Walton Street, N.W. 
Atlanta, Georgia 30303 
(404) 688-1202 
FAX (404) 688-9440 
February 14, 1989 
Professor Ira Robbins 
Washington College of Law 
The American University 
4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20016 
Re: Habeas Corpus Task Force 
Dear Professor Robbins: 
I write to respond to your invitation of January 4 to com-
ment on and provide information regarding the issues before the 
task force. I apologize for my failure to get these comments to 
you more promptly. Unfortunately, since the first of the year I 
have been consumed by our stopgap efforts to respond to the lack 
of counsel problem. 
With regard to ranking the issues before us, I agree with I 
Judge Stephens that the most pressing problem is the ineffective 
assistance of counsel at all stages of the process -- trial, 
direct appeal and post-conviction review. The responsibilities 
of counsel are so basic to the proper functioning of the adver-
sary system that we must propose some solutions if we are to meet 
our objectives of making the entire process rational and avoiding 
executions "flawed by fundamental factual, legal, or constitu-
tional procedural error.".l/ There are of course two aspects to 
this problem. The first is one of competence -- the need for the 
specialized expertise required to ensure that all facts are 
properly developed and all issues properly raised. The second is 
the general unavailability of counsel due to inadequate compensa-
tion or, in many states, no compensation at all in post-convic-
tion proceedings, and to other factors I will discuss. 
Providing competent and qualified counsel would be the best 
means of ensuring that all constitutional issues are identified 
and resolved on their merits before a person's life is extin-
guished. However, until adequate counsel is assured for both the 
trial and direct appeal, I would rank as a problem of equal 
1. ABA Proposal to State Justice Institute for creation of 
the task force, at page 3. 
:/ 
Prof. Ira Robbins 
February 14, 1989 
Page 2 
importance the failure of federal courts to address the merits of 
claims due to procedural defaults in the state courts made by 
counsel out of ignorance, not because of any knowing tactical 
decision. 
Competent representation at every stage of the process would 
also do more than anything else, in my view, to eliminate dis-
jointed, chaotic and protracted habeas corpus review. Chaos in 
post-conviction proceedings is not limited to "last minute" 
appeals. Often it occurs during presentation of the first peti-
tion for habeas corpus because of lack of counsel and litigation 
under the time pressures of a warrant. This chaos during the 
first trip through post-conviction procedures almost invariably 
results in failure to include some claims and failure to exhaust 
others, inadequate factual development, poor briefing, remands 
from the courts of appeals, second petitions and other problems. 
Thus, undue haste, as well as delay, is a major problem which 
should be addressed. 
I would rank fourth the inadequacy of the post-conviction 
review processes in many states for developing facts and deciding 
constitutional issues. The denial of subpoena power and expert 
witnesses in some states makes it impossible to present relevant 
facts at state hearings. Political pressures often interfere 
with judicial decision making. Issues of exhaustion of state 
remedies and successive petitions are obviously of concern to us 
as well, but I would rank them behind the first four in order of 
importance. 
I will address each of these in turn, providing what refer-
ences and anecdotal information I have along the way. I will not 
discuss the problem of cumbersome federal procedures except to 
say here that I agree with John Greacen's comments at our first 
meeting that the "quick exit" procedures associated with in forma 
pauperis status, certificate of probable cause to appeal and so 
forth, complicate rather than facilitate consideration of federal 
habeas corpus cases. 
A. The quality and availability of counsel. 
I do not suggest that the task force investigate the problem 
of counsel at each stage of the process. However, we should take 
notice of the abundance of material from courts and commentators 
that clearly demonstrates the existence of an extremely serious 
problem. In response, I hope that we will recommend that action 
be taken to involve the most outstanding members of the legal 
Prof. Ira Robbins 
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profession in providing the highest quality representation in 
these cases. At the very least, I hope that we will recommend 
the implementation of standards and practices that will dramati-
_cally improve the quality of representation. Our recommendations 
need not to be particularly detailed or specific, but they should 
provide general guidance on how to begin the process of achieving 
truly competent representation. 
Legislatures and bar associations in the states that impose 
the death penalty would benefit substantially from such recommen-
dations and from a report that informs them that they pay the 
price later for inadequate indigent defense at the initial 
stages. After a review of the problem, I make some suggestions 
of the form that such recommendations might take. 
1. The special demands of representation 
in a capital case. 
It is now universally recognized that representation of an 
individual in a capital case is an extraordinary responsibility 
placed upon any lawyer. As summarized recently by former Chief 
Judge John Godbold of the Eleventh Circuit, "taking a death case 
... is not something most lawyers want to do. In the first 
place it's hard. It is the most complex area of the law I deal 
with •.•• [T)he death penalty isn't imposed on people for 
trivial things. The community is often inflamed. The press is 
often inflamed. The state trial judge is often inflamed if you 
question what he did."Y The Florida Supreme Court has just 
concluded that a capital case by definition involves "extraordi-
nary circumstances and unusual representation." White v. Board 
of Commissioners, So.2d (Fla. Jan. 26, 1989) (slip opin-
ion enclosed). Seealso, e.g., People v. Wade, 233 Cal. Rptr 48, 
43 Cal.3d 366, 729 P.2d 239 (1987) ("the defense of a capitally 
charged individual involves an enormous undertaking ..•. Obvi-
ously, the job is not one for every member of the bar or even 
every member of the criminal defense bar.") 
Counsel must not only be able to deal with the most serious 
crime, homicide, in the most difficult circumstances, but must 
2. Mikva and Godbold, You Don't Have to be a Bleeding 
Heart: Representing Death Row, 14 Human Rights 21 (Winter, 
1987), quoted in Kubat v. Thieret, 690 F. Supp. 725 (N.D. Ill. 
1988). 
Prof. Ira Robbins 
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also be thoroughly knowledgeable about a complex body of consti-
tutional law and unusual procedures that do not apply in other 
criminal cases. Bifurcated capital cases involve two trials with 
two different sets of issues. Investigation must often be con-
ducted in a number of states, and, in some cases, in foreign 
countries. See generally Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effec-
tive Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 299 (1983) (standards and procedures critical for ensuring 
quality of defense in death penalty cases); Gredd, Washington v. 
Strickland: Defining Effective Assistance of Counsel at Capital 
Sentencing, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1544 {1983). · 
One would hope that because of the extraordinary demands and 
extraordinary complexity of capital cases, representation would 
always be undertaken by the best and the brightest in the legal 
profession. Certainly, this should be the aspiration of our 
legal system. Nonetheless, it is often not the case. Serious 
deficiencies in the quality of representation frequently under-
mine the process of determining who dies from trial through post-
conviction review. 
2. The problem at trial. 
The inadequacy of counsel at trial complicates and lengthens 
all later stages of review. Justice Thurgood Marshall has twice 
addressed the poor quality of representation at trial in remarks 
to the Second Circuit Judicial Conference. In 1986 he made the 
following observations: 
[CJ api tal defendants frequently suffer 
the consequences of having trial counsel who 
are ill-equipped to handle a capital case .. 
Often trial counsel simply are unfamiliar 
with the special rules that apply in capital 
cases ...• Though acting in good faith they 
inevitably make very serious mistakes. For 
example, I have read cases in which counsel 
have been unaware that certain death penalty 
issues are pending before the appellate courts 
and that the claims should be preserved, or 
that a separate sentencing phase would follow 
a conviction. The federal reports are filled 
with stories of counsel who presented no evi-
dence in mitigation of their client's sentences 
Prof. Ira Robbins 
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because they did not know what to offer or how 
to offer it, or had not read the state's sen-
tencing statute.]./ 
One of Justice Stevens' law clerks observed after his tenure at 
the Court that "[w]hether somebody received the death penalty 
very often seemed to be a function of the quality of the lawyers . 
. . . [T]he death penalty frequently results from nothing more 
than poverty and poor lawyering.".!/ Those with other vantage 
points have made similar observations . .2,/ Both Justice Marshall 
and the former clerk noted that often high quality legal assis-
tance was provided only in post-conviction review when it was too 
late to correct the deficiencies of the earlier representation. 
The Attorney General of Georgia and at least one justice of 
the Georgia Supreme Court have attributed the length of post-
conviction review in capital cases in that state to the inade-
quacy of counsel for indigent defendants at trial . .§/ Georgia's 
recent experience with capital punishment has been marred by 
3. Marshall, Remarks on the Death Penalty Made at the 
Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 
1-2 (1986) (emphasis in original). Justice Marshall gave other 
examples of deficient representation in capital cases in his most 
recent remarks to the Second Circuit Conference last September. 
Marshall, Remarks at the Second Circuit Judicial Conference 
(Sept. 1988). 
4. Sloan, High Court's Handling of Death Cases, Fulton 
County Daily Report, March 25, 1987, at 2, 3. 
5. See,~, Wicker, Defending the Indigent in Capital 
Cases, 3 Crim. Justice Ethics 2 (1983) (observing a pattern of 
incompetent representation in capital cases); Neal, Death Row 
Inmates Point to Poor Quality of Lawyers Who Defend Them, Los 
Angeles Times, Oct. 29, 1986, CC/Part I, p. 12; Strauss, 
Indigent legal defense called Hterrible," The Atlanta Journal & 
Constitution, July 7, 1985, at Al. 
6. Justice Harold G. Clarke said that the process takes so 
long because of Georgia's failure to fund a state-wide network of 
public defenders. Attorney General Michael Bowers was quoted as 
saying: "If you can get death row inmates good lawyers at trial, 
I guarantee you these cases will move a lot faster." Thompson, 
Lack of Public Defenders Cited in Costly Death Row Appeals, The 
Atlanta Journal & Constitution, Nov. 12, 1988, at Cl (enclosed). 
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examples of inadequate representation ranging from virtually no 
representation at all by counsel,1/ to failures to investigate 
basic threshold questions,Y to lack of knowledge of governing 
law,2/ to lack of advocacy on the issue of guilt,.l.Q/ to failure 
to present a case for life at the penalty phase . .llJ Even many 
instances in which the performances of counsel have passed con-
stitutional muster under the Strickland test lY and executions 
have been carried out, the representation provided has neverthe-
7. See,~, House v. Balkcom, 725 F.2d 608 (11th Cir. 
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 870 (1984) (counsel not even pres-
ent during portions of capital trial); Young v. Zant, 677 F.2d 
792, 795 (11th Cir. 1982) (counsel failed to provide weven a 
modicum of professional assistance at any timew during capital 
trial). 
8. See,~, Curry v. Zant, 258 Ga. 527, 371 S.E.2d 647 
(1988) (counsel ineffective for failing to get independent psy-
chiatric evaluation of defendant to determine competency). 
9. See,~, Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794 (11th Cir. 
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1098 (1983) (conviction and death 
sentence set aside where counsel unaware of law, distanced him-
self from his client, and otherwise failed to render effective 
assistance). 
10. See,~, Francis v. Spraggins, 720 F.2d 1190 (11th 
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1059 (1985) (defense counsel 
conceded guilt during closing argument at guilt phase). 
11. See,~, Zant v. Hamilton, 251 Ga. 552, 307 S.E.2d 
667 {1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 988 (1984) (death sentence 
vacated because of failure to present evidence in mitigation); 
Tyler v. Kemp, 755 F.2d 741 {11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 
U.S. 1026 (1985) (same); Thomas v. Kemp. 796 F.2d 1322 (11th Cir. 
1986) (same); Johnson v. Kemp, 615 F. Supp. 355 (S.D. Ga. 1985), 
aff'd. without opinion, 781 F.2d 1483 (11th Cir. 1986) (same); 
Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 523 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 
U.S. 998 (1985) (same). 
12. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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less been of exceptionally poor quality.llf In some instances, 
mistakes by counsel have resulted in the execution of one person 
while that person's codefendant has obtained relief on the iden-
tical issue.l.!J This is not a rational system of review, it is a 
game of roulette. 
I cite the Georgia experience only as an example. Represen-
tation has been no better in other states with which I am famil-
iar, particularly Alabama, Mississippi, and Virginia. There are 
not more than four or five attorneys who are competent to try a 
capital case in each of those states. The Mississippi Supreme 
Court has observed that although "death penalty litigation has 
13. See,~, Messer v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1080, 1093-1097 
(11th Cir. 1985), (Johnson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 474 
U.S. 1088 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari) (at guilt phase, counsel gave no opening statement, pre-
sented no defense case, conducted cursory cross-examination, made 
no objections, then emphasized horror of crime in brief closing; 
at penalty phase, counsel failed to put on steady employment 
record, military record, church attendance, and cooperation with 
police, and in closing "repeatedly hinted that death was the most 
appropriate punishment." Even though Messer's mental state was 
the only issue at both the guilt and penalty phases, he was 
denied a mental health expert because counsel failed to make an 
adequate showing that one was needed for the defense case. 
Messer v. Kemp, 831 F.2d 946 (11th Cir. 1987) (en bane); Mitch-
ell v. Kemp, U.S. , 97 L.Ed.2d 774 (1987) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (attorney made no attempt 
to contact any mitigating witnesses, made no inquiries into 
client's academic, medical, or psychological history, and thus 
failed to present case in mitigation). Both Messer and Mitchell 
have been executed. 
14. See,~, Smith v. Kemp. 715 F.2d 1459, 1476 (11th 
Cir. 1983) (Hatchett, J., dissenting) (Smith executed despite 
unconstitutional jury composition because lawyer did not file 
challenge; codefendant's lawyer filed challenge, won new trial, 
and his client was sentenced to life in prison by a jury which 
reflected a fair cross-section of the community); Stanley v. 
Kemp, 737 F.2d 921 (11th Cir. 1984), application for a stay 
denied, 468 U.S. 1220 (1984) (Stanley, a mentally retarded of-
fender, executed despite burdenshifting instruction on intent 
because attorney did not preserve issue; more culpable codefen-
dant granted full relief on same issue in Thomas v. Zant, 800 
F.2d 1024 (11th Cir. 1986)). 
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become highly specialized ••• few attorneys have 'even a sur-
face familiarity with seemingly innumerable refinements put on 
[the U.S. Supreme Court's capital decisions].'" Irving v. State, 
441 So.2d 846, 856 (Miss. 1983). 
The inadequacy of representation at the trial level greatly 
increases the risk of convictions flawed by fundamental factual, 
legal or constitutional error. It also contributes to protracted 
post-conviction litigation. Much time is consumed during state 
and federal habeas review determining whether these lackluster 
performances by counsel pass the Strickland standard. Time is 
also spent developing material facts relevant to other issues 
which should have been investigated and presented either before 
or during trial.15/ It is unrealistic to expect the system to 
operate better when its most fundamental component -- informed, 
diligent and effective advocacy -- is missing. 
3. Post-conviction representation. 
Everyone acknowledges that there is a crisis in the lack of 
counsel to handle capital cases in post-conviction proceedings. 
I would like to add a thought about the need for competence as 
well. 
At our first meeting, it was suggested that claims in a 
post-conviction proceeding are limited only by the imagination or 
creativity of counsel. I have not found this to be the case. 
15. A good example is a case we litigated recently in which 
the federal district court held hearings on whether a mentally 
retarded offender understood and intelligently waived his Miranda 
rights. These facts should have been developed during a hearing 
on a motion to suppress statements prior to trial. Instead, 
considerable time was spent in the federal courts developing the 
facts and correcting an error which should have been corrected 
prior to trial. Smith v. Zant, 855 F.2d 712 (11th Cir. 1988). 
This is not unusual. See,~, Coleman v. Zant, 708 F.2d 541 
(11th Cir. 1983) (remanding for evidentiary hearing on facts 
regarding pretrial publicity which should have been developed 
prior to trial on motion for change of venue); Green v. Zant, 
715 F.2d 551 (11th Cir. 1983) (remanded for evidentiary hearing 
on facts regarding excusal of juror which should have been devel-
oped when juror was excused during trial); Spencer v. Zant, 781 
F.2d 1485 (11th Cir. 1986) (remanding for evidentiary hearing on 
jury challenge which should have been litigated before trial). 
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When a competent lawyer prepares a petition for post-conviction 
review, he or she relies not upon imagination, but upon knowledge 
of constitutional law and an understanding of the facts. That 
lawyer directs a thorough investigation based upon an understand-
ing of the legal significance of certain facts which might be 
developed. If a competent lawyer prepares and litigates a case 
in post-conviction review, I think it quite unlikely that another 
"more creative" lawyer will find other issues in that same case. 
The problem arises when cases are prepared and litigated by 
incompetent lawyers.1.§/ Often the lawyer on post-conviction · 
review, like the trial lawyer described by Justice Marshall, is 
completely unaware of a whole body of applicable law. A compe-
tent lawyer who later reviews that case will recognize that issue 
not because he or she is more imaginative, but because he or she 
keeps up with the advance sheets. 
An incompetent lawyer may fail to conduct the investigation 
necessary to raise relevant issues. I just became aware of a 
case in Alabama in which the lawyer who has handled the post-
conviction litigation for eight years has never once visited his 
client. He is unaware of basic facts necessary to do an adequate 
job because he has not undertaken the most fundamental first step 
of investigation, a client interview. Many lawyers have been 
appointed to cases in post-conviction review in Alabama who are 
totally ignorant of habeas corpus law and procedure and make no 
attempt to learn. They make serious mistakes due to their in-
competence which will either complicate or delay post-conviction 
review or deprive their clients of meaningful review. 
Resource centers, funded by state and federal governments, 
have been established in a number of states to respond to this 
problem. But in many states there is still no funding for coun-
sel and the resource centers are completely dependent upon pro 
bono representation in every case. I believe that the supply of 
pro bono lawyers is about exhausted. Moreover, the threat of 
16. The recent argument before the Supreme Court in Penry 
v. Lynaugh, cert. granted, 108 s.ct. 2896, 101 L.Ed.2d 930 
(1988), provided a shocking example of incompetent representa-
tion in post-conviction representation. The brief filed on 
behalf of Penry was exceptionally poor, and the oral argument was 
pathetic. After the argument there was more comment on the poor 
quality of representation than the issues argued. Penry's coun-
sel did not understand the issues he was supposed to argue in a 
capital case before the Supreme Court of the United States. 
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sanctions for lawyers volunteering to take on these cases JJ.../ is 
having a chilling effect on the willingness of lawyers to under-
take representation. 
4. The causes of this problem. 
The reasons for this situation are obvious and readily ac-
knowledged. The most basic is the lack of financial incentive r 
for attorneys to develop a specialization in capital punishment 
law and take death cases. In many states, representation in a 
capital case pays virtually nothing. For example, Miss. Code. 
Ann. § 99-15-17 limits compensation of appointed counsel in a 
capital case to $1,000. Only a handful of attorneys will take on 
a difficult and complex case at less than the federal minimum 
wage. Of course, post-conviction representation pays even less, 
if anything at all, in many jurisdictions. 
It is virtually impossible to interest law school graduates 
in this area of the law because it is almost impossible to make a 
living at it. Nor do many practitioners enthusiastically embrace 
the long standing notion that they have a professional obligation 
to provide their services to indigents for free or at rates so 
reduced that they threaten counsel's survival.JJV As the Florida 
Supreme Court has pointed out in two opinions, the "relationship 
between an attorney's compensation and the quality of his or her 
representation cannot be ignored." White v. Board of County 
17. See Bell v. Lynaugh, 858 F.2d 978, 985-986 (5th Cir. 
1988) (Jones, J., concurring); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 860 F.2d 165, 
166 (5th Cir. 1988). 
18. This burden seems only to fall upon defense lawyers. 
Those who begin their careers as prosecutors or in other areas of 
law are not called upon to render professional services for free 
unless they volunteer to do so. However, courts are increasingly 
recognizing that "[t]he obligation to provide counsel for indi-
gent defendants is that of the state, not of the individual 
attorney.* State ex rel Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816, 835-836 
(Kan. 1987). Accord Delisio v. Alaska, 740 P.2d 437, 443 (Ala. 
1987); State v. Robinson, 465 A.2d 1214, 1216 (N.H. 1983}; 
Bradshaw v. Ball, 487 S.W.2d 294, 298-300 (Ky. 1972). 
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Commissioners, slip op. at 6 (enclosed); Makemson v. Martin 
county, 491 So.2d 1109, 1114 (Fla. 1986) . .l.2/ 
Of course, lack of compensation not only contributes to the 
unavailability of lawyers, but also to the poor quality of per-
formance actually rendered. A lawyer paid $1,000 will not devote 
one thousand hours to a capital case, even if the case requires 
it. Lawyers in post-conviction proceedings do not conduct ade-
quate investigations and or seek evidentiary hearings because 
they are unwilling to devote large amounts uncompensated time to 
the case. 
An equally serious aspect of this problem is the lack of 
resources for investigators and expert witnesses, which are 
essential for discovery and presentation of crucial facts. All 
too frequently these facts are presented for the first time in 
federal review because the petitioner was denied the means to 
present them at trial or in state post-conviction review. 
Other factors contributing to this problem are the lack of 
any indigent defense system in some states, the absence of any 
specialists in capital punishment work, the lack of any training 
or continuing legal education programs on the defense of capital 
cases, and the lack of any standards for the appointment or 
performance of counsel. These factors contribute to the unavail-
ability of counsel and the inadequacy of counsel at all stages of 
the process. Thus, by addressing this problem and making recom-
mendations, we can contribute to an effective system of advocacy 
from trial through post-conviction review. 
5. Areas for recommendations. 
The problem of inadequate counsel will be solved only if 
states spend the money necessary to attract the best lawyers to 
take on the most difficult cases and provide the highest quality 
of representation. Any other solutions simply wink at reality 
and contribute almost nothing to solving the problem. 
19. In White, the Court observed that not only did the 
lawyer receive token compensation, but his private practice 
suffered as well. #Such conditions will undoubtedly prevent or 
discourage Mr. White and others like him from representing indi-
gent defendants on behalf of the state in the future.• Slip op. 
at 7. 
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The Florida Supreme Court has said: w[S]ince the state of 
Florida enforces the death penalty, its primary obligation is to 
ensure that indigents are provided competent, effective counsel 
in capital cases.• White v. Board of Commissioners, slip op. at 
5. This task force should make it clear to other states as well 
that they have this same primary obligation. We should also make 
it clear that the review process will not function rationally so 
long as states refuse to pay enough to attract competent counsel. 
I would propose that we attempt to develop recommendations 
along this line for improvement in the quality of representation 
at all stages of the process: 
a. Adequate resources must be committed for 
representation at all stages of the process. 
All jurisdictions should be urged to recognize that capital 
cases are extraordinary and require a corresponding commitment of 
resources for defense counsel, investigation and expert 
witnesses. 
b. A jurisdiction should have some system 
for providing counsel for indigent 
persons in capital cases. 
Many capital punishment states, such as Georgia, Alabama, 
Mississippi and Louisiana, still have no indigent defense sys-
tem. The quality of representation at all levels will not im-
prove until this situation changes. States should be encouraged 
to establish at the very least appellate defender and capital 
punishment defender programs to provide quality representation in 
capital cases. 
c. Specialization in capital litigation should 
be developed and specialists employed as 
counsel at all stages. 
Jurisdictions need to recognize the need for specialization 
in this area and follow examples like Kentucky's Office of Public 
Advocacy, which has a major crimes unit made up of veteran trial 
lawyers who take on the most complex and demanding cases in the 
state. Often those are capital cases. Often these lawyers work 
with the local attorneys, who see a capital case so infrequently 
that they do not keep abreast of all the developments in capital 
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law and procedure. North Carolina has an excellent appellate 
defender office, which guarantees that lawyers with an expertise 
in capital punishment law prepare briefs to that state's supreme 
court and are available to trial lawyers in the state. We should 
commend these models to other states that do not have the 
resources to have more comprehensive indigent defense programs. 
The resource centers are a first small step in this direc-
tion. They respond to the urgent need to recruit and assist 
lawyers for the condemned in post-conviction litigation. Howev-
er, there is an even greater need to have a group of qualified 
lawyers who can actually take on the cases at the trial level and 
assure that all issues are raised and all facts developed. 
d. There must be adequate training, continuing 
legal education, and resource assistance for 
attorneys assigned to capital cases. 
Many of the lawyers who are regularly involved in various 
stages of capital litigation have never attended a training or 
continuing legal education program in the area, even though such 
programs are available. We should consider recommending that 
such programs be held in all capital punishment jurisdictions and 
that attendance be a qualification for representation. 
e. Standards for appointment and performance of 
counsel must be employed. 
As Dean D'Alemberte pointed out at our first meeting, the 
American Bar Association has published standards for representa-
tion in criminal cases and the National Legal Aid and Defender 
Association has published standards for representation in capital 
cases. Many of those involved in the assignment of cases and in 
providing representation are not even aware that these standards 
exist. It would be appropriate for this ABA task force to at-
tempt to breathe some new life into these standards. 
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B. Merits determinations of claims. 
Primarily because of the deficiencies of counsel, the proce-
dural default rules have not achieved their primary objective of 
making the trial of a capital case the "main event."2..QJ Instead, 
they have added a new dimension to litigation throughout the 
process during which, as pointed out by Justice Robertson of the 
Mississippi Supreme Court, the states often assert procedural 
bars "not because such would promote the interests of justice, 
but rather that such would pull the rug out from under [the 
petitioner) when he ultimately seeks federal review of his 
case."£11 Litigation of whether there was a default,~ whether 
the states regularly enforce their rules,2.1,/ whether the default 
should be excused,£1/ and other related questions contribute sig-
nificantly to the protracted nature of habeas corpus litigation. 
20. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977). 
21. Evans v. State, 441 So.2d 520, 531 (Miss. 1983) (Rob-
ertson, J., dissenting). Justice Robertson found "our affection 
for procedural bars to be particularly unseemly" because it came 
only after seven of the first eight Mississippi cases to be 
reviewed in the federal courts resulted in the death sentence 
being vacated. "Our obligation on our oaths is to decide care-
fully the merits of each constitutional claim tendered by each 
person sentenced to die. Our eye must be affixed to justice, not 
slated toward Wainwright v. Sykes .... " 441 So.2d at 533. 
22. See,~, Campbell v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1573, 1576-
77 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 s.ct. 1652 (1986) (federal 
court unable to sort out which claims state court decided on 
merits and which on procedural grounds); Cooper v. Wainwright, 
807 F.2d 881 (11th Cir. 1986). 
23. See,~, Wheat v. Thigpen, 793 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 
1986) (refusing to bar federal relief where rule was not clearly 
announced and regularly followed prior to its application in 
petitioner's case); Spencer v. Kemp, 781 F.2d 1458 11th Cir. 
1986) (en bane) (refusing to bar federal relief where new state 
rule applied retroactively). 
24. See,~, Amadeo v. Kemp, 773 F.2d 1141, 1145 (11th 
Cir. 1985) (remanded for evidentiary hearing on cause for failure 
to raise issue); Hoffman v. Wainwright, 651 F.2d 347, 349 (5th 
Cir. 1981) (same). 
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Regardless of how these issues are resolved, they require a great 
deal of time. 
The strict adherence to procedural default rules rests upon 
the fiction that counsel at trial and direct appeal knew the 
applicable law and facts and made intelligent, tactical decisions 
with a full understanding of the consequences to the case and 
client. Unfortunately, as summarized in the previous section, 
this fiction has no relation to reality. The interests of jus-
tice and the efficient and orderly consideration of these cases 
would be served by reaching the merits in all but the most excep-
tional cases, where it is clearly established by the state that 
there was actual withholding of a claim. 
C. Chaotic litigation. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist used the Ted Bundy case as an exam-
ple of last minute chaos in death penalty cases in his speech to 
the ABA Mid-Year Meeting last week. It is also an example of the 
chaos which occurs in the initial review of a post-conviction 
case in some state and federal courts. 
Certiorari was denied on Bundy's direct appeal on May 5, 
1986.£2./ Two weeks later, on May 22, the Governor signed a death 
warrant, which resulted in his execution date being set for July 
3. State post-conviction relief proceedings went through the 
Florida state courts during June and were concluded on June 30. 
The same day, Bundy filed a habeas corpus petition in the federal 
district court. Two days later the district court denied relief. 
During the two days Bundy's case was pending in the district 
court, the state record, more than 10,000 pages long, was in the 
trunk of the car of counsel for the state. Nevertheless, the 
state relied extensively on the record in its pleadings and 
arguments in asserting that all the claims were procedurally 
defaulted, that trial counsel was effective, and that Bundy had 
25. All of the facts set out in this paragraph are from the 
opinion in Bundy v. Wainwright, 808 F.2d 1410, 1412-1414 (11th 
Cir. 1987). 
Prof. Ira Robbins 
February 14, 1989 
Page 16 
received a full and fair competency hearing . .£§/ Obviously, the 
record was never considered by the district court before denying 
the petition. The Eleventh Circuit issued a stay on the evening 
before the scheduled execution. Six months later, the Court of 
Appeals found it necessary to remand the case to the district 
court for more orderly and proper consideration. Bundy v. Wain-
wright, 808 F.2d 1410 {11th Cir. 1987). 
This type of chaos is not exceptional . Several years ago I 
was asked to represent James Raulerson, who was scheduled to be 
executed in three weeks by Florida. I had never heard of 
Raulerson, never seen the record in his case or even read the 
state court opinion affirming his conviction. In the next three 
weeks, I read parts of the record, did a little investigation, 
prepared lots of pleadings, had a hearing in state court, argued 
before the Florida Supreme Court, and conducted something of an 
evidentiary hearing in federal court on ineffective assistance of 
counsel and other issues. The district court denied a stay and 
denied the petition. The Eleventh Circuit issued a stay and set 
brief~ng in three weeks. Oral argument was a few weeks later. 
It was only after Raulerson's case was submitted to the 
Court of Appeals that we had an opportunity to complete our 
investigation. We found his best claim had not been raised. 
This required a second petition, which was ultimately denied.llf 
Raulerson was executed. It is of course impossible to know wheth-
er the court would have found merit in the claim if it had been 
raised in the first petition. However, it would be hard to 
conclude that this process was a desirable way to determine 
important constitutional issues.l.§/ 
As we discussed at our first meeting, many states and courts 
have reached the conclusion that such chaotic and disorderly 
26. 808 F.2d at 1417. The record was lodged in the dis-
trict court only after dismissal of the petition on the merits 
had been announced. 808 F.2d at 1414. 
27. These cases are reported as Raulerson v. Wainwright, 
732 F.2d 803 {11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 966 {1984); 
Raulerson v. Wainwright, 735 F.2d 869 {11th Cir. 1985). 
28. Other examples of chaos resulting from litigation under 
warrant and lack of counsel are documented in Mello, Facing Death 
Alone: The Post-conviction Attorney Crisis on Death Row, 37 Am. 
U.L. Rev. 513, 576-581 {1988). 
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litigation of initial applications for post-conviction relief are 
counterproductive. In many jurisdictions, counsel for the state 
simply notifies counsel for the petitioner (if there is one) that 
an execution date will be scheduled unless a post-conviction 
review petition is filed within a specified time. The petitions 
are filed and litigation commences. This approach seems so 
sensible, so flexible, and so much in the best interest of all 
concerned that I do not understand why it is not followed every-
where. It is vastly superior to a statute of limitations which 
would operate inflexibly against persons without counsel to file 
their petitions. · 
D. Inadequacy of state court processes for 
development of facts and resolution of issues. 
Some of the jurisdictions which impose capital punishment 
with the most frequency do not provide for indigent prisoners to 
subpoena witnesses for their post-conviction hearings.w Many 
have no provision for expert witnesses for indigent petitioners. 
As a result, hearings are often one-sided affairs in which only 
the state is able to present witnesses and death-sentenced peti-
tioners are unable to present facts indispensable to a resolution 
of their claims. This generally requires a hearing in federal 
court where subpoena power and expert witnesses are available.J_Q/ 
There are also problems with adjudication of these claims 
that should concern us. At our first meeting, Mr. Hill pointed 
out the tactical advantages to the state of having findings of 
fact made by judges elected by the people of Georgia instead of 
Article III federal judges. But this responsiveness to the 
voters also raises serious questions of judicial independence. 
The judge in Butts County, Georgia, who handles the bulk of the 
habeas petitions filed by death-sentenced inmates has never once 
granted relief. Few would be surprised if he never does. And no 
one doubts that he would be out of a job if he granted relief in 
29. See,~, Neal v. Smith, 226 Ga. 96, 98, 172 S.E.2d 
684, 686 (1970) (Georgia laws do "not contemplate that the public 
shall bear the expense of bringing witnesses into court.") 
30. See,~, Thomas v. Zant, 697 F.2d 977 (11th Cir. 
1983) (evidentiary hearing required in federal court because 
petitioner could not compel the attendance of critical witness to 
state court hearing). 
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even a small percentage of the cases in which relief is 
ultimately granted by the federal courts which review the cases. 
In several jurisdictions in which I practice, judges often 
conclude cases by signing orders prepared by the state without 
the slightest modification. These *orders• are frequently only 
slightly reworked versions of the state's brief, not findings 
carefully reached by an impartial judge. In one of our Alabama 
cases, the file stamps by the clerk's office indicated that the 
judge signed the state's proposed findings just fifteen minutes 
after they were filed and several hours before our proposed 
findings were filed the same day. In a Florida case, the state 
prepared an order which dismissed some claims on grounds which it 
had never asserted previously and thus were not addressed by the 
petitioner. The court signed the order without even striking the 
word •proposed• from the caption. 
While it may be that busy, overburdened courts must solicit 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in order to 
discharge their business, the complete abandonment of the judi-
cial function to the prevailing side should not be given any 
deference by other reviewing courts. Perhaps nothing can be done 
about the political pressures on elected judges, but we should 
not be blind to the realities of those pressures in studying 
these problems and making our recommendations. 
We should recommend that states provide the means for ade-
quate development of facts. I hope that we will also be able to 
develop some recommendations for ways in which state court judges 
could discharge their duties in an fair, impartial and indepen-
dent manner. 
E. Exhaustion of state remedies. 
I agree with Judge Stephens comments that the exhaustion 
requirement has outlived its usefulness and should not be applied 
unless there is an obvious intentional bypass of the state 
courts. 
Exhaustion is now generally dealt with at the outset of a 
habeas corpus case. In answering the petition, the state usually 
either asserts of failure to exhaust or acknowledges that state 
remedies have been exhausted. The courts have developed proce-
dures for giving the petitioner the opportunity to exhaust and 
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the state the opportunity to waive exhaustion . .1.l/ It would 
obviously save time and contribute to the orderly process of 
adjudicating the case if the federal court and considered the 
unexhausted claims along with the exhausted ones. These consid-
erations outweigh whatever interest there may be in providing the 
state with some tactical advantage of having factfindings made by 
elected judges. 
F. Successive petitions. 
In my experience, successive petitions are filed because 
what once appeared to be a meritless claim now may entitle the 
petitioner to relief due to a significant change of law or the 
discovery of new facts. As I said previously, I do not believe 
that the raising of these claims can be attributed to a sudden 
burst of creativity or imagination on the part of counsel. I 
caution against abandoning an equitable approach to the claims 
raised in these petitions. I will draw from two recent cases to 
illustrate my concerns. 
In Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. , 107 s.ct. 1821, 95 
L.Ed.2d 347 (1987), the Supreme Court unanimously held that a 
Florida jury instruction which limited the consideration of 
mitigating circumstances was unconstitutional. This claim had 
been rejected in numerous decisions by the Eleventh Circuit, and 
several who asserted it were executed before Hitchcock was decid-
ed. But some who lost on this issue in their first trip through 
habeas review are still alive. Now that the law is clear, is the 
state entitled to a few last unconstitutional executions of these 
petitioners just because they litigated the issue and lost before 
Hitchcock was decided? Or should those petitioners get the 
benefit of this new constitutional pronouncement? After all, it 
is not the petitioners' fault that their first petitions were 
rejected under what turned out to be an erroneous interpretation· 
of the law. 
31. See,~, Arango v. Wainwright, 716 F.2d 1353 (11th 
Cir. 1983), rehearing denied with opinion, 739 F.2d 529 (1984) 
(district court instructed to hold case until state claims are 
exhausted); Thompson v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 
1983) (district court may postpone consideration of issues until 
exhausted; state may waive exhaustion; district court may accept 
or reject waiver). 
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With regard to newly discovered facts, the same type of 
equitable inquiry seems appropriate to me. For example, if the 
state had some role in keeping the relevant facts from the peti-
tioner during litigation of his first petition, why should the 
petitioner be penalized because the state made it impossible for 
him to discover those facts? Or, if it was absolutely impossible 
to discover the facts earlier for some other reason, why should 
the petitioner who was in no way at fault be penalized by the 
mere coincidence of the timing of the discovery? 
In Mccleskey v. Kemp,llf it was discovered during consider-
ation of a successive petition only two days before the scheduled 
execution that statements used against Mccleskey were obtained in 
violation of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). The 
district court found that "reasonably competent counsel" could 
not have discovered the evidence supporting the claim prior to 
the first federal petition. (McCleskey's lawyers had investi-
gated the claim before the first habeas petition but found no 
evidence to support it.) I use this case only as an illustra-
tion. Assuming the accuracy of the district court's findings, it 
would seem unconscionable to execute a petitioner once he estab-
lishes that his conviction was obtained in violation of the 
constitution and that he is in no way to blame for the failure to 
bring the facts to light earlier. 
Problems with consideration of the first habeas petition --
lack of counsel, the inadequacy of counsel and the haste of adju-
dication -- also contribute to successive petitions. I have 
already discussed these matters. Undoubtedly, there would be 
fewer successive petitions if cases were handled properly the 
first time. 
At this point in my thinking, I find myself in disagreement 
with four justices of the Supreme Court and my colleagues on the 
task force who would supplement the "ends of justice" inquiry on 
relitigating claims on successive petitions with the requirement 
of "a colorable showing of factual innocence."J.l/ The purpose of 
federal habeas corpus review is to vindicate the Constitution, to 
safeguard the integrity of the process. Innocence is generally 
irrelevant. When a death-sentenced petitioner tried to convince 
32. Mccleskey v. Kemp, civ. No. 1:87-CV-1517-JOF (N.D. Ga. 
orders of December 23, 1988 and January 10, 1989. 
33. Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986) (opinion of 
Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Rehnquist and O'Connor, JJ.). 
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the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in his first habeas 
action that he was factually innocent because a witness against 
him had recanted his testimony and admitted committing the crime, 
the Court responded: w[T]he role of habeas corpus is limited to 
consideration of challenges to the legality of a conviction; it 
may not be used to retry the defendant's innocence or guilt.w.li./ 
I do not see why this role should change upon consideration of a 
successive petition. Vindication of constitutional rights on 
successive petitions should turn on the equities relating to the 
reasons the facts or law were not presented earlier. Otherwise, 
instead of encouraging full development of the facts by all sides 
during the first habeas review, the law would encourage hiding 
the ball until the game is over. 
I hope that these thoughts are useful to you in preparing 
the issues paper. 
Best wishes, 
Enclosures 
cc: The Honorable Malcolm M. Lucas 
The Honorable Alvin Rubin 
The Honorable Rosemary Barkett 
Dean Talbot D'Alemberte 
Mr. John M. Greacen 
Mr. William B. Hill 
)Prof. James s. Liebman 
Sincerely, 
Stephen B. Bright 
Director 
\'The Honorable Barefoot Sanders 
The Honorable Donald W. Stephens 
Mr. Thomas c. Smith 
34. Drake v. Francis, 727 F.2d 990, 994 (11th Cir. 1984), 
modified in other respects, 762 F.2d 1449 (1985) (en bane), cert. 
denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986). 
L. RALPH MECHAM 
DIRECTOR 
JAMES E. MACKLIN, JR 
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EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
ST. PAUL. M I NNESOTA !5!517!5 
February 10, 1989 
TO: MR. JUSTICE POWELL AND MEMBERS OF THE 
AD HOC COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 
REVIEW OF CAPITAL SENTENCES 
I am deeply interested in the work of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus Review of Capital 
Sentences. I have had the privilege of teaching and 
lecturing on habeas corpus at various universities, and in 
the past 23 years I have written several articles and over 
one hundred opinions in this area. I will try to make my 
observations succinct for your readings purposes. 
First, I think it is important that the Committee 
appreciate the broader significance its study on habeas 
corpus review of capital sentences will have on the overall 
law. Members of Congress have indicated they will look to 
the work of the Committee as a guideline for reform of all 
federal habeas corpus review. Therefore, as the Committee 
structures its recommendations, it is imperative that it 
consider the rippling effect its recommendations will have on 
all habeas corpus cases. 
Second, I am well aware of Chief Justice Rehnquist 1 s 
concern over the delay incurred in habeas corpus cases that 
involve the death sentence. I respectfully suggest that much 
of the delay in habeas cases is caused by procedural rules 
created by the judiciary itself. I submit the following for 
your consideration: 
( 1) It would be far more expeditious to pass on a 11 
exhausted habeas claims, without dismissal, where non-
exhausted claims are included. The vast majority of judges 
and commentators feel the holding of Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 
509 ( 1982) is counter-productive to the efficient 
administration of habeas claims. I do not believe in the 
principle that prisoners "sandbag" simply to get a second 
hearing in court. If a prisoner knows he has a meritorious 
claim, it will be raised as soon as possible. However, the 
incentive to exhaust all claims would be even further 
enhanced through adoption of the procedural bars hereinafter 
suggested. 
It is my experience, and that voiced by almost all of 
the district and circuit judges attending the Judicial 
1 
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Conference discussion of this topic three years ago, that 
many of the requirements of procedural preclusion have 
created undue judicial burdens and in that sense such 
standards defeat the objective of judicial efficiency in the 
processing of habeas petitions in federal court. This is 
especially true in capital cases. 
I am fully aware that the Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 
72 (1977) cause and prejudice standard is based upon 
deference and finality to state court judgments. 
Nonetheless, this standard has had at least two rippling and 
debilitating effects upon the federal judicial system: 
(a) Ineffective assistance of counsel now appears to 
be, with the exception of very few cases, the sole basis upon 
which "cause" can be established under Sykes principles. The 
rise in claims of ineffective assistance of counsel can be 
traced statistically with the advent of the cause and 
prejudice principles of Wainwright. This fact has brought 
about a disruption in the continuity of appointment of 
counsel by requiring every habeas petitioner to assert as a 
last resort a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
against the trial, appeal or post-conviction counsel. As a 
consequence, the court no longer benefits from having the 
same counsel who is familiar with the overall record. 
Furthermore, because of these claims, understandably, there 
is a general lack of enthusiasm among the bar to be appointed 
counsel for an indigent accused in a criminal case. 
(b) The Sykes principle has also created a constant 
procedural burden for federal district and appellate judges 
in analyzing whether a particular habeas corpus claim may 
proceed. I recently read a opinion by our court in a capital 
case in which the panel spent twenty pages discussing the 
cause and prejudice application to the factual and procedural 
history of the case and then resolved the merits within two 
pages. The consideration of procedural history which is 
necessary to resolve cause and prejudice claims now 
preoccupies the time of counsel and the court before simple 
claims may be resolved. The Justice Department's own figures 
demonstrate that less than two percent of habeas petitions 
state meritorious claims. The vast majority of federal 
judges agree that habeas cases could be more rapidly 
processed and easily resolved if we could simply go directly 
to the merits of the case. 
Because state courts are doing a good job in "toeing the 
constitutional mark," in the vast majority of cases, the 
federal courts, if permitted to go directly to the merits, 
could dispose of claims without spending the substantial 
-2-
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amount of time necessary to research voluminous court 
records to determine whether cause exists to allow 
consideration of a belated claim. Under these circumstances, 
I respectfully submit there must be some direct means to 
permit federal courts to evaluate all of a habeas 
petitioner's constitutional claims without concern for a 
procedural bar. I am well aware that there are state 
interests to be served by having state courts initially 
review such claims. The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies 
sufficiently serves state interests. If the Committee were 
to propose alternatives that would make review of the merits 
more accessible, it would diminish the time required by 
federal judges to adjudicate habeas petitions. While I 
concede that my proposal may not adequately satisfy all state 
interests, e.g. the contemporaneous objection rule, I believe 
that a much more simplistic approach which removes 
consideration or procedural requirements would provide 
improved habeas review. 
(2) It is disturbing to many judges, as well as to many 
lawyers, that the courts allegedly use rules of procedural 
bar to prevent a petitioner, who has been sentenced to death, 
from raising a constitutional claim. As we know, however, 
under Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986) and Murray v. 
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) principles of Sykes only apply 
where the record is devoid of any constitutional claim which 
undermines the guilt determination or the sentencing 
process. I respectfully submit, therefore, that in all 
capital cases, regardless of the Wainwright rule, a court 
must examine whether there exists a constitutional claim 
which effectively undermines the determination of guilt and 
the capital sentence. Why shouldn't a federal court's review 
of all successive or repetitive petitions for habeas corpus 
be based solely on the same simplistic approach? In other 
words, once the initial petition for habeas has been 
dismissed, all subsequent petitions should be dismissed 
unless there is some constitutional deficiency which 
undermines the sentencing process (e.g., failure to submit 
known mitigating evidence) or the guilt determination (e.g., 
tainted eye-witness identification). If there exists proof 
of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 {1984), this claim would certainly 
be reviewed under this proposed standard. This is the rule 
stated in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 {1963) that 
deals with successive petitions. It seems to me this 
succinct standard should be applied in every case without 
regard to the Sykes principles. 
Of course, an initial petition filed by a person under 
the death sentence, assuming the petitioner has exhausted his 
-3-
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remedies, may raise constitutional deficiencies which do not 
require actual prejudice (e.g., Batson issue of 
discrimination). 
Thus, by legislation if necessary, the entire process to 
review habeas petitions could be expedited by (1) immediate 
resolution of all exhausted claims; (2) adjudication of all 
constitutional claims in initial petitions without concern of 
a procedural bar once exhaustion has taken place; and ( 3) 
review only those claims in subsequent petitions which 
effectively challenge the guilt determination or the 
sentencing process. (See Detroit Law Review a r ticle 
attached). 
I am enclosing a copy of a recent opinion, Mercer v. 
Armentrout, No. 88-2547 (8th Cir. 1989), relating to a 
prisoner who was recently executed in Missouri. In this 
case, we acknowledged the procedural bar but nonetheless 
reviewed his constitutional claims under the principles of 
the Murray case. The point I wish to make is that principles 
of review under the Murray case are essential to the review 
of every habeas case. The fact is that few habeas cases 
will succeed where there is not a constitutional deficiency 
that directly relates to the guilt determination or the 
sentencing process. In short, the rule developed in the 
Murray case obviates the Sykes principles and should serve as 
a guideline in the review of every habeas case where 
petitioner's initial petition for habeas relief has been 
denied. This would permit the federal judiciary to provide 
an expeditious but fair review of all habeas petitions 
including capital cases. 
I appreciate that these recommendations may seem overly 
simplified and special study and select language would be 
required to make them effective. However, I respectfully 
submit these thoughts as a guideline for consideration by the 
Committee. 
Sincerely yours, -\ ,,,. 
C. / __ ... __ ...,,__ 
DONALD P. LAY 
~Ii 
DPL/ja 
cc: Chief Justice Rehnquist 
• 
-4-
'DETROIT COLLEGE OF LA w 
REVIEW 
The Constitution, the Supreme Court, 
and Mr. Meese: Habeas Corpus and 
the Doctrine of Original Intent 
Donald P. Lay 
Volume 1986 - Issue 4 
WINTER 
• 
THE CONSTITUTION, THE SUPREME 
COURT, AND MR. MEESE: HABEAS CORPUS 
AND THE DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL INTENT 
Donald P. Layt 
"It may farther be said, that, though men be much governed by interest; 
yet even interest itself, and all human affairs, are entirely governed by 
opinion."' 
In recent months we have been confronted with vilifying attacks 
on Attorney General Edwin Meese because of his criticisms of the 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court. His basic criticism, 
which he claims has historical support, is that the modern Court, 
in its interpretation of the Constitution, has ignored the original 
intentions of the framers. Mr. Meese recently stated that the Su-
preme Court's decisions need not be followed since its holdings are 
only the law of the case, and everyone else remains free to inter-
pret the Constitution in his or her own way.2 His generalized at-
tack on the Supreme Court has been echoed by many of his subor-
dinates with at least one resulting in a shameless attack on one of 
the Justices. When Mr. Meese's comments received national cover-
age, a well-known television actor retorted by calling him "a walk-
ing obscenity," a nationally known syndicated writer branded him 
an "anarchist," and one of my judicial friends commented that Mr. 
Meese "should be removed from office." The national reaction to 
Mr. Meese's comments has caused his associates to recast his in-
tended meaning and the Attorney General to concede that he 
could have chosen his words more carefully. Unfortunately, as he 
should know, a retraction or restatement is seldom given the same 
national focus as the original story. Upon reflection, two thoughts 
come to mind. 
t Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Judge Lay wishes 
to express his sincere gratitude for the editing assistance of his law clerk, Karen D. McKay, 
J.D., Creighton University, 1985. 
1. 1 D. HUME, ESSAYS MORAL POLITICAL, AND LITERARY, No. 7, 125 (1882) (emphasis 
supplied) . 
2. But cf. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (in the name of religion, one 
may not become a law unto himselO. 
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First, it has always been difficult for me to understand why in-
telligent people must resort to personal vilification when what they 
disagree with are the ideas and perspective of another. Negative 
attacks in political campaigns have become so popular that many 
people have come to prefer personal denigration of another over 
reason and intellectual debate. I sense that Robert Kennedy and 
Dr. Martin Luther King would have lived full lives if reason and 
fair debate would have been substituted for personal hatred. Why 
is it that we cannot apply reason and understanding to opposite 
points of political view? Debating whether a political idea is good 
or bad, true or false, acceptable or not, is the fundamental purpose 
behind our freedom of expression. Perhaps the greatest attribute 
of our nation is the continuing recognition that we grow and im-
prove upon our political worth by our open willingness to examine 
critically our alleged well-being. 
It seems to me that this philosophy is irrefragable and one from 
which this nation continually draws its political strength. In con-
trast, when visiting Russia two years ago, I was indelibly impressed 
with the response of a young Communist party leader, whom I 
asked, "Svetlana, why do you need secret police to spy on your 
people?" She replied, "Secret police are needed to spy on our peo-
ple so that we can maintain stability in our political order." 
This brings me to the second reflection on the Attorney Gen-
eral's comments. Whether one agrees with Mr. Meese or not, we 
should, in this bicentennial of our Constitution, be grateful to him 
for bringing to national attention the importance of constitutional 
interpretation. In so doing, the Attorney General has made more 
citizens aware of the greatest document in American history. Cer-
tainly much of the current proliferation of historical research and 
commentary must be credited to those like Attorney General 
Meese who advocate returning to what is called the "jurisprudence 
of original intent" in constitutional construction. 
I do not believe that the Attorney General, as Anthony Lewis 
and Paul Brest have urged in syndicated columns, advocates anar-
chy. When he states that the Constitution, not the Supreme Court, 
is the final law, he is doing no more than what Justices of the Su-
preme Court have argued, mostly in dissent, for years. Chief Jus-
tice Burger, voicing disagreements with Warren Court decisions, 
proclaimed this view when he first came to the Court. It should be 
obvious to all that what the Attorney General is trying to say is 
' 
1986] Habeas Corpus and Original Intent 985 
that when the Supreme Court announces a constitutional rule, it 
should always be subject to further challenge and revision. Simply 
because the Supreme Court is expounding the Constitution does 
not mean we should be bound by the Court's decisions when in the 
light of history and analysis they appear to be wrong. To urge such 
re-examination does not constitute an attack on the Court or the 
Constitution it interprets. 
Members of the Court itself have debated the effect and desira-
bility of stare decisis in constitutional interpretation. Unfortu-
nately, when the Court reverses precedent because of shifts in 
analysis or content or because new Justices arrive bringing with 
them different substantive philosophies about constitutional inter-
pretation, the Court itself contributes to undermining public confi-
dence in the institution and public trust in its judgments. 3 In re-
cent years, the most notable shift by the Court has been in the 
area of federalism. Two of the more pronounced examples of disre-
gard of precedent have dealt with the tenth amendment and fed-
eral habeas corpus. 
In 1968 the Court announced, in Maryland u. Wirtz,• that the 
Fair Labor Standards Act provision applicable to state employees 
working in state institutions was a constitutional prerogative of 
Congress under the commerce clause and not in derogation of the 
tenth amendment. In 1976 the Court reversed itself in National 
League of Cities u. Usery.r, In 1982 the Court held, in EEOC u. 
Wyoming,6 that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act asap-
plied to state employees was not in derogation of states' rights. In 
1985, with Justice Blackmun's change in vote, the Court overruled 
Usery and held in Garcia u. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority7 that Wirtz was good law and state employees were pro-
tected by federal law. In Garcia Justice Blackmun said of stare 
decisis: 
We do not lightly overrule recent precedent. We have not hesitated, how-
ever, when it has become apparent that a prior decision has departed 
from a proper understanding of congressional power under the Com-
merce Clause. Due respect for the reach of congressional power within 
3. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
4. 392 U.S. 183 (1968). 
5. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
6. 460 U.S. 226 (1982). 
7. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
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Recently in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & 
Gynecologists,9 Justice Stevens and Justice White debated the 
doctrine of stare decisis as it applies in constitutional cases. Jus-
tice White urged overruling Roe v. Wade, 10 notwithstanding the 
doctrine of stare decisis: 
The rule of stare decisis is essential if case-by-case judicial decision mak-
ing is to be reconciled with the principle of the rule of law, for when 
governing legal standards are open to revision in every case, deciding 
cases become a mere exercise of judicial will, with arbitrary and unpre-
dictable results . . . . 
The Court has [however) adhered to the rule that stare dee is is is not 
rigidly applied in cases involving constitutional issues, and has not hesi-
tated to overrule decisions, or even whole lines of cases, where experi-
ence, scholarship, and reflection demonstrated that their fundamental 
premises were not to be found in the Constitution. Stare decisis did not 
stand in the way of the Justices who, in the late 1930's, swept away con-
stitutional doctrines that had placed unwarranted restrictions on the 
power of the State and Federal Governments to enact social and eco-
nomic legislation. Nor did stare decisis deter a different set of Justices, 
some fifteen years later, from rejecting the theretofore prevailing view 
that the Fourteenth Amendment permitted the States to maintain the 
system of racial segregation. In both instances, history has been far 
kinder to those who departed from precedent than to those who would 
have blindly followed a rule of stare decisis. 11 
Justice Stevens responded: 
[T)he fact that the doctrine of stare decisis is not an absolute bar to the 
reexamination of past interpretations of the Constitution [does not] 
mean that the values underlying that doctrine may be summarily put to 
one side. There is a strong public interest in stability, and in the orderly 
conduct of our affairs, that is served by a consistent course of constitu-
tional adjudication. Acceptance of the fundamental premises that under-
lie the decision in Roe v. Wade, as well as the application of those prem-
ises in that case, places the primary responsibility for decision in matters 
of childbearing squarely in the private sector of our society. The majority 
remains free to preach the evils of birth control and abortion to persuade 
others to make correct decisions while the individual faced with the real-
8. Id. at 557 (citation omitted). See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116-17 
(1941). 
9. 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986). 
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
11. 106 S. Ct. at 2192-93 (White, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 
U.S. 530, 543 (1962) (opinion of Harlan, J.). 
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ity of a difficult choice of having serious and personal consequences of 
major importance to her own future - perhaps to the salvation of her own 
immortal soul - remains free to seek and to obtain sympathetic guidance 
from those who share her own value preferences. 12 
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This intellectual exchange lends support to Attorney General 
Meese's point that we should remain vigilant in challenging the 
Court's analysis if it has departed from the "proper" understand-
ing of the Constitution. In a recent statement, Mr. Meese echoed 
what others have long said: "Instability in decisions concerning the 
fundamental principle of federalism does our Constitution no ser-
vice." Ironically, Mr. Meese prefaced this remark by stating, "we 
hope for a day when the Court returns to the basic principles of 
the Constitution as expressed in Usery." This remark, of course, 
mirrors Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Garcia. 13 
Mr. Meese is quite right to advocate stability in decision making. 
Our Constitution should not change due to the political vagaries of 
the newest appointee to the Court. Empirical judgment should not 
be concocted overnight and transformed the next day. On the 
other hand, it would indeed be an idyllic world, but perhaps an 
environment lacking in growth, if the Constitution would lend it-
self to only one interpretation with which everyone agrees. The 
weakness of Mr. Meese's argument is that the concept of original 
intent as he perceives it lacks not only historical persuasion but 
also a clear articulation of meaning. It seems more likely that his 
argument masks his own political concerns. He simply does not 
agree with some of the decisions of the Court. He is a spokesman 
for an administration that has campaigned on a platform favoring 
school prayer, opposing abortion, and supporting greater limits on 
the rights of the accused. When Supreme Court decisions result in 
an interpretation of the Bill of Rights that contradicts this politi-
cal and philosophical platform, he disagrees with the holding under 
the guise of disagreeing with the process. 
Subjectivism invariably affects one's point of view. Every trial 
lawyer knows that the self-interest of a witness is always an avenue 
for an attack on credibility. Mr. Meese has described himself as 
12. 106 S. Ct. at 2189 (Stevens, J. , concurring). 
13. "I do not think it incumbent on those of us in dissent to spell out further the fine 
points of a principle that will, I am confident, in time again command the support of the 
majority of this Court." Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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the "number one cop" in the United States. Thus, his point of 
view, particularly about the procedure in criminal cases, must be 
weighed with an admitted prosecutorial bias. The remark generally 
attributed in the press to Mr. Meese that accused persons do not 
warrant rights because "everyone knows that most suspects are 
guilty" was unfortunate. With all due respect, these observations 
manifest a basic misunderstanding of criminal procedure and the 
rights afforded to the accused under our Constitution. One place 
where this is most obvious is in the Justice Department's proposed 
legislation to preclude federal habeas corpus review of state convic-
tions. If this legislation becomes law, I believe it would corroborate 
Mr. Meese's miscomprehension of the Constitution as it applies to 
an accused, guilty or innocent. 
Although the Supreme Court is certainly not beyond criticism, 
generalized attacks on the Court often merely echo the flag-waving 
rhetoric of the 1970's made popular by public figures like Spiro 
Agnew and John Mitchell. These attacks have bolstered an on-go-
ing perception in the eyes of the American public that the Consti-
tution and the Supreme Court's interpretation of it are too soft on 
criminals. Consequently, there exists a popular sentiment that 
criminals have rights and their victims do not. 
This criticism must be weighed against the basic principle that 
much of the Bill of Rights was written to assure individual rights 
and liberties for all citizens against oppressive government. The 
fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments provide protection to our citi-
zenry to make certain that any individual accused of a crime, 
which may result in a conviction depriving that person of liberty or 
life, is tried by fair procedures. For the Constitution to have sub-
stance and meaning, these rights must be construed to protect per-
sons considered "bad" as well as those considered "good." These 
rights have been empirically tested through the years, and our An-
glo-American history amply justifies the need for the doctrine of 
presumption of innocence, the fifth amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination, the right to be free from warrantless searches 
and seizures, the right of counsel, and the right to due process in 
every aspect of a criminal trial. If these rights do not protect those 
who are ultimately found guilty, they have no vitality or meaning 
to any of us. 
Mr. Meese and the Justice Department presently support legis-
lation, currently in committee, which, if passed, would effectively 
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destroy the efficacious use of the writ of habeas corpus for state 
prisoners. 14 The general effect of the bill is to codify the rule of 
Stone v. Powell, 111 which precludes any constitutional claim by a 
state prisoner from being heard in a federal court if the state court 
held a "full and fair hearing." Stone v. Powell affects only fourth 
amendment claims brought by state prisoners. At this point, the 
Supreme Court has refused to extend this rule of preclusion to any 
other type of claim. The result sought by the Justice Department 
would in effect take us back to 1915 when, in Frank v. Mangum, 16 
the Supreme Court refused to review the constitutionality of a 
mob-dominated trial in Georgia simply because the constitutional 
questions had received full review in the Georgia Supreme Court. 
In my judgment, this would be an unfortunate result. In the name 
of federalism, the administration seeks to shut the door on two 
hundred years of progress toward guaranteeing that all accused are 
afforded their federal constitutional rights in state criminal pro-
ceedings. In effect, in the name of federalism, the administration is 
willing to ignore the rationale that led to the adoption of the 
supremacy clause. 
The Justice Department points to three basic reasons in support 
of the habeas bill: (1) there are too many frivolous habeas cases 
filed in federal courts and this accounts for the overload of federal 
district court and appellate dockets; (2) there should be greater fi-
nality accorded to state court convictions; and (3) principles of fed-
eralism as espoused in Stone v. Powell require exclusive responsi-
bility by state courts when dealing with constitutional rights of 
state prisoners. 
The first argument can be answered in many ways. There are 
approximately 800 federal district judges in the United States. Ad-
14. See S. 2903, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 302, 128 CONG. REC. Sll,408 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 
1982); H.R. 7117, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CoNG. REC. H7088 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1982); S. 
2903, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 202, 128 CONG. REC. Sll,407-10 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1982); H.R. 
7117, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H7088 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1982); See also Sallet 
& Goodman, Closing the Door to Federal Habeas Corpus: A Comment on Legislative Pro-
posals to Restrict Access in State Procedural Default Cases, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 465 
(1983). 
15. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). But see Kimmelman v. Morrison, 106 S. Ct. 2574, 2582-87 
(1986) (Stone u. Powell restriction on habeas review of fourth amendment claim does not 
preclude habeas review of sixth amendment claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that 
are based upon ineffective representation with respect to fourth amendment issues). 
16. 237 U.S. 309 (1915). 
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ministrative Office statistics show that in 1985, state prisoners filed 
approximately 8000 habeas corpus petitions. Assuming a straight 
line equation, this allocates approximately ten habeas petitions per 
judge. This number fails to account for magistrates who assist in 
processing habeas cases. In my judgment, federal courts, though 
busy, are not, as exaggerated claims are made, overburdened. 
Second, the Justice Department's own figures show that approxi-
mately two percent of state habeas cases warrant relief. I think this 
is true because state courts are for the most part "toeing the con-
stitutional mark," and most state prisoners today receive fair con-
stitutional trials in the state courts. The Justice Department urges 
further habeas preclusion in the federal courts due to the fact that 
state courts are so vigilant in protecting prisoners' rights. This ar-
gument, however, overlooks the fact that states are toeing the con-
stitutional mark in part because of the continuing availability of 
habeas corpus processes within the federal system. The Justice De-
partment's argument also overlooks state court rules that proce-
durally bar a post conviction remedy if a prisoner has failed to 
raise the issue on direct appeal.17 This is purportedly done in the 
interests of finality. Such a rule, however, effectively closes the 
state courthouse door and leaves the federal court as the only re-
maining forum for constitutional relief. 
At the heart of the criticism of federal habeas review for state 
prisoners is the need for finality in criminal prosecutions, the sec-
ond justification for the proposed legislation. However, a number 
of safeguards now exist to prevent piecemeal litigation that serves 
merely to vex, harass, or delay.18 Unfortunately, recent decisions of 
the Supreme Court have placed so many procedural obstacles in 
the path of state prisoners that finality is often sidetracked into an 
exhaustive search for procedural compliance.19 In the interest of 
preventing piecemeal litigation, the rule of total exhaustion of all 
claims was implemented in Rose v. Lundy.20 When this rule is 
combined with the Wainwright v. Sykes21 requirement of contem-
poraneous objection and cause and prejudice, it becomes very diffi-
17. See, e.g., State v. Pope, 218 Neb. 361, 355 N.W.2d 216 (1984). 
18. But cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1977). 
19. See Rosenn, The Great Writ-A Refl,ection of Societal Change, 44 Omo ST. L.J. 337, 
360 (1983). 
20. 455 U.S. 509 (1982). 
21. 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
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cult for a state prisoner to obtain any federal review of the merits 
of the conviction.22 
Rather than reducing state habeas petitions, these procedural 
rules have resulted in time-consuming analyses by federal courts 
and recurring remands to the state courts before the merits of a 
case can be reached. I am sure this counterefficiency is not what 
the Supreme Court had in mind. Judicial efficiency would be bet-
ter served if federal courts went directly to the merits if remand to 
the state court is futile. In the vast majority of cases, the interests 
of finality would be better served because the petitioners' constitu-
tional rights have been afforded by the state.23 
One positive step occurred last term in Murray v. Carrier" when 
Justice O'Connor suggested that a state prisoner who asserts inno-
cence in his claim will not be hampered by the procedural require-
ments barring federal court review of the merits of the case. This 
sign by the Court that it is unwilling to eliminate totally federal 
habeas review through procedural hurdles suggests that its con-
cerns about comity and finality do not measure up to the constitu-
tional guarantees at risk. Justice Harlan, who was not a great devo-
tee of many of the Warren Court decisions, conceded this point 
when he said that "[t]he consequences of injustice-loss of liberty 
and sometimes loss of life-are far too great to permit the auto-
matic application of an entire body of technical rules whose pri-
mary relevance lies in the area of civil litigation."211 Any interest in 
finality must be subordinated when constitutional rights are at risk 
and life or liberty is at stake. 
The third justification offered by the Justice Department in sup-
port of the legislation is the interest in maintaining a proper bal-
ance of state and federal power. The argument is that states 
should retain ultimate responsibility for state convictions and state 
prisoners. It is in this area that Attorney General Meese urges Su-
preme Court reform. It is here, according to the doctrine of original 
intent, that state interests in state criminal proceedings deserve 
22. See Address by Professor I. Robbins, reprinted in Whither (Or Wither) Habeas 
Corpus?: Observations on the Supreme Court's 1985 Term, 111 F.R.D. 265 (1986). 
23. Many federal judges agree that the previous waiver rules of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 
(1963) , and Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), are easier to apply and preserve princi-
ples of finality as well or better than the current requirements. 
24. 106 S. Ct. 2639 (1986). 
25. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24 (1962) (Harlan, J ., dissenting). 
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paramount protection. 
FEDERALISM 
In discussing principles of federalism, particularly as they relate 
to habeas corpus, a succinct understanding can be gained by con-
trasting a statement of former Attorney General John Mitchell 
with one of Chief Justice John Marshall. Mitchell was vigorous in 
his criticism of the habeas process in federal court and argued that 
because of it, we are left with a "hydra of excess procedure." Chief 
Justice Marshall provides the best answer to Mr. Mitchell: if state 
courts were given final jurisdiction over federal causes, the result 
would be a "hydra in government, from which nothing but contra-
diction and confusion can proceed. "26 Predictability and stability 
in constitutional interpretation will not flow from fifty different 
versions of the same constitutional principle. Federal courts, and 
ultimately the Supreme Court, were meant to be the final arbiters 
of the meaning of the federal Constitution. 
Justice Frankfurter observed in Brown v. Allen27 that federal 
habeas jurisdiction "is not a case of a lower court sitting in judg-
ment on a higher court" but rather "one aspect of respecting the 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution whereby federal law is 
higher than State Law."26 In light of Congress' grant of jurisdiction 
to federal courts to review a state's interpretation of constitutional 
law, "[t]he state court cannot have the last say when it, though on 
fair consideration and what procedurally may be deemed fairness, 
may have misconceived a federal constitutional right."29 It must be 
remembered that it is the federal Constitution and not state law 
that federal judges are expounding. Of course, the quick response 
to this has always been that state judges are just as capable and 
responsible as federal judges in interpreting federal constitutional 
principles. I certainly agree that every state judge should be as ca-
pable as a federal judge in applying constitutional principles. To-
day, as in the past, there are many excellent state court jurists. 
Many have sparkling academic records and perhaps on an individ-
ual basis stand above the degree of intelligence of some federal 
26. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 415-16 (1821). 
27. 344 U.S. 443 (1952). 
28. Id. at 510. 
29. Id. at 508. 
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judges. But discussing comparable skills and intelligence misses 
the point. 
In Stone v. Powell,30 the Supreme Court suggested that state 
court judges have historically been assumed as competent and 
qualified as federal judges in resolving constitutional claims: 
The policy arguments that respondents marshal in support of the view 
that federal habeas corpus review is necessary to effectuate the Fourth 
Amendment stem from a basic mistrust of the state courts as fair and 
competent forums for the adjudication of federal constitutional rights. 
The argument is that state courts cannot be trusted to effectuate Fourth 
Amendment values through fair application of the rule, and the oversight 
jurisdiction of this Court on certiorari is an inadequate safeguard. The 
principal rationale for this view emphasizes the broad differences in the 
respective institutional settings within which federal judges and state 
judges operate. Despite differences in institutional environment and the 
unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional claims of some state 
judges in the past, we are unwilling to now assume that there exists a 
general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial 
and appellate courts of the several States. State courts, like federal 
courts, have a constitutional obligation to safeguard personal liberties 
and to uphold federal law.31 
Justice Powell's comments "ignore the point stressed by many of 
the framers - the lack of complete judicial independence of many 
state judges due to limited terms of office, dependency on appoint-
ment or election, and, in some cases, legislative control of state ju-
30. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
31. Id. at 493-94 n.35. Although I risk the barbs of my state judicial brethern, it is none-
theless interesting to compare Justice Powell's observation with that of our first Chief Jus-
tice, John Jay, then writing as the third Publius in The Federalist No. 3: 
[W]hen once an efficient national government is established, the best men in the 
country will not only consent to serve, but also will generally be appointed to 
manage it; for, although town or country, or other contracted influence, may place 
men in State assemblies, or senates, or courts of justice, or executive departments, 
yet more general and extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications will 
be necessary to recommend men to offices under the national government, - es-
pecially as it will have the widest field for choice, and never experience that want 
of proper persons which is not uncommon in some of the States. Hence, it will 
result that the administration, the political counsels, and the judicial decisions of 
the national government will be more wise, systematical, and judicious, than those 
of individual States, and consequently more satisfactory with respect to the other 
nations, as well as more SAFE with respect to [ourselves). 
THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 21-22 (J. Jay) (M. Dunne ed. 1901). See also G. WILLS, EXPLAIN-
ING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 248-53 (1981). 
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dicial salaries. "32 The concern is not so much with the competency 
of state judges as it is with their ability to survive in institutional 
settings if they were to enforce vigorously the constitutional rights 
of unpopular defendants. Chief Justice Marshall stressed this point 
in Cohens v. Virginia 33: 
States may legislate in conformity with their opinions, and may enforce 
those opinions by penalties. It would be hazarding too much to assert 
that the judicatures of the states will be exempt from the prejudices by 
which the legislatures and people are influenced, and will constitute per-
fectly impartial tribunals. In many states, the judges are dependent for 
office and for salary, on the will of the legislature. The Constitution of 
the United States furnishes no security against the universal adoption of 
this principle. 
When we observe the importance which the Constitution attaches to the 
independence of judges, we are less inclined to suppose, that it intended 
to leave constitutional questions such as this to tribunals which may not 
possess this independence, in all cases where a state shall prosecute an 
individual who claims the protection of an act of Congress. Even without 
a legislative Act these prosecutions may take place. A person making a 
seizure under an act of Congress may be indicted as a trespasser if force 
has been employed, and of this, a jury may judge. How extensive may be 
the mischief, if the first decisions in such cases should be final! 34 
A personal anecdote illustrates the point. In 1972, as the repre-
sentative of the Eighth Circuit, I attended the ABA judiciary din-
ner in San Francisco. I was seated at the head _table along with 
Justice Powell. That evening the main speaker was Justice Rear-
don of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, a distinguished state ju-
rist. His speech dealt in part with federal habeas corpus practice. 
He vigorously criticized federal judges and the Supreme Court for 
allowing a system where federal judges could overrule a state su-
preme court decision concerning a federal constitutional matter. 
My reaction, with all due respect, was twofold. First, this was (I 
had thought by then) the antiquated attack that had been made 
against the Warren Court ten years before. Second, there was no 
mention of the historical position of Madison and Marshall con-
32. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the 
Original Understanding of Article Ill, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 814 n.233 (1984); see also 
Pollak, Proposals to Curtail Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: Collateral Attack 
of the Great Writ, 66 YALE L.J. 50, 55 (1956). 
33. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). 
34. Id. at 385. 
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cerning the supremacy clause, nor was there acknowledgement that 
Congress, not the Court, had extended federal jurisdiction to pro-
vide such a review. However, Justice Reardon's speech did not fall 
on deaf ears. Justice Powell expressed Justice Reardon's thoughts 
in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.3 r, Later, in Stone v. Powell,36 Jus-
tice Powell relied on federalism principles to preclude federal 
courts from reviewing state criminal convictions in cases involving 
fourth amendment claims if the state had provided a full and fair 
hearing on the issue. 
I relate this story because my experience has an epilogue. The 
companion case to Stone v. Powell was a criminal case that 
originated in then my home base of Omaha, Nebraska. It was enti-
tled Rice v. Wol/f,37 and its judicial history is brief. The defend-
ant's conviction was affirmed by the Nebraska Supreme Court. The 
United States Supreme Court denied the writ of certiorari. There-
after, the federal district court granted a writ of habeas corpus. 
The Eighth Circuit panel affirmed the district court. The Supreme 
Court reversed the circuit court on the principle announced in 
Stone v. Powell. Collateral attack on fourth amendment issues was 
barred since the state court, even though wrong, had granted a full 
and fair hearing. 38 
Rice v. Wolff involved the murder of a police officer who had 
been lured to a vacant house by a telephone caller claiming that a 
woman's screams had been heard within the house. The house was 
booby-trapped. A bomb went off, and the officer was tragically 
killed. A search of a black militant headquarters uncovered traces 
of dynamite. There was no question that under existing federal 
constitutional standards, there was no probable cause for the 
search because it was based solely upon an anonymous informant's 
tip. Whitely v. Warden39 controlled, and the federal district judge 
properly issued the writ overturning the state conviction. 
During the state court trial, there was great publicity surround-
ing the case. The Omaha World Herald reported on a critical rul-
ing to be made by the state judge on the defendant's motion to 
35. 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
36. 428 U.S. at 493-94 n.35. 
37. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
38. Id. at 494. 
39. 401 U.S. 560 (1971) . 
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suppress. At lunch one day, the state judge approached me and 
stated that he was going to rule on the motion to suppress that 
afternoon. He related that he was planning to overrule the motion 
despite the obvious illegality of the search because community 
pressure to convict was intense and he was in an elective office. 
Since our court would eventually get the case, he stated that he 
was not going "to take the heat of the community." The rest is 
history. Notwithstanding the obvious illegality of the search, Rice's 
conviction was reinstated by the Supreme Court. 
I mention this incident not to tell tales out of school but to illus-
trate the prescience of Madison in The Federalist No. 78 and, de-
spite Justice Powell's protestations, to point out that contempo-
rary concerns about the proper balance of state and federal power 
do not, just as they did not in 1787 and 1867, neutralize fundamen-
tal constitutional guarantees. 
ORIGINAL INTENT 
The debate over the proposed legislation to eliminate habeas 
corpus centers around federalism concerns. The proper balance of 
state and federal power is also at the heart of the debate over origi-
nal intent. The policy arguments favoring states' rights and re-
sponsibilities are generally vindicated under the rubric of the doc-
trine of original intent and the urging that the Constitution is a 
consensual compact entered into by the states. This thesis requires 
an examination of early constitutional history:'0 
A recurring issue in the political struggle over ratification in-
40. For an excellent scholarly commentary on the pros and cons of original intent, see 
Bennett, Judicial Activism and the Concept of Original Intent, 69 JUDICATURE 218 (1986); 
Berger, New Theories of "Interpretation": The Activist Flight from the Constitution, 47 
Omo ST. L.J . 1 (1986); Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary 
Ratification, 43 LAW. GUILD PRAC. 1 (1985); Brest, Who Decides?, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 661 
(1985) ; Clinton, Judges Must Make Law: A Realistic Appraisal of the Judicial Function in 
a Democratic Society, 67 lowA L. REV. 711 (1982); Meese, The Attorney General's View of 
the Supreme Court: Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intention, Nov., 1985, Pue. ADM. 
R. 701; P owell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985); 
Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976); Rakove, Mr. 
Meese, Meet Mr. Madison, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec., 1986, at 77. I also heartily recom-
mend, particularly this year, the excellent, easily read book by Catherine Drinker Bowen, 
MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS MAY TO SEP-
TEMBER 1787 (1986). Further scholarly works include R. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 
(1980); C. MILLER, THE SUPREME CouRT AND THE UsEs OF HISTORY (1969); L. TRIBE, Goo 
SAVE Tms HONORABLE COURT (1985); G. WILLS, supra note 31. 
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volved the inherent character of the proposed Constitution. The 
modern concept of original intent grew out of the late eighteenth 
century view of the Constitution as a contract among individual 
sovereign states. This, in turn, reflected Anti-Federalist views dur-
ing the ratification debates that the proposed Constitution was a 
compact among independent, sovereign states, equal in stature and 
united only to the extent that they had delegated limited powers 
to the federal government. From this perspective, the federal polit-
ical structure was merely the product of the contract and was in-
trinsically powerless without this delegation of authority. 
These independent sovereign states were also considered the fi-
nal authority in constitutional interpretation because the contract 
did not create a legal heirarchy in which the states were inferior to 
the federal government. A contract theory as the basis of American 
political order ensured a proper balance of state and federal power 
and protected the vitality of state sovereignty by setting out, in 
plain contractual terms, the rights of states and the limits on the 
federal government. The Anti-Federalists believed that the pro-
posed Constitution invited unwarranted interpretation by federal 
legislators and judges, the latter not held politically accountable. 
Eventually, this interpretation would sap inherent state sover-
eignty and create a federal despot. The Anti-Federalists believed a 
better approach was to treat the Constitution as a consensus 
among states and not as an edict from the federal government, es-
pecially since the very existence of the federal government de-
pended on the will of the contracting parties. 
The Constitution's contractual basis naturally led to an interpre-
tive method based on the intent of the contracting parties. This 
occurred despite the absence in the Constitution of any references 
to the states as sovereign contracting parties. The only hint in the 
text of retained state sovereignty is the tenth amendment. Far 
from an affirmative grant of state sovereignty, the amendment pro-
vides only that powers "not delegated" to the federal government 
or prohibited by it to the states are reserved "to the states . . . or 
to the people of America. "41 This language cannot reasonably be 
construed as a catch-all of state sovereignty.•2 
41. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
42. Significantly, as pointed out by Wills, supra note 31, in EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE 
FEDERALIST, the words are not those of enumeration but of delegation. Much of federal 
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Because the contract did not create a legal superior to settle dis-
putes over constitutional language, late eighteenth century Repub-
licans, who at that time were resisting sweeping federal sedition 
laws, began divining the contracting parties' intentions to give 
meaning to broad constitutional language. This quest for the in-
tent of contracting parties did not involve the subjective expecta-
tions of the framers. Instead, it involved determining what rights 
and powers the states logically delegated, while protecting their 
sovereign status. As evidence of this, Republicans relied on the 
states' proposed amendments and reservations of rights as condi-
tions of ratification. Then, like now, this extra-textual evidence of 
intent was viewed as an attempt to legitimize a view supported by 
neither the letter or the spirit of the Constitution. 
The characterization of the Constitution as a contract was 
widely accepted at the turn of the century, except by the Supreme 
Court under Chief Justice John Marshall. The debate over consti-
tutional interpretation rekindled in the 1820's. By this time the 
Republican majorities in Congress had dwindled and New England 
Federalists threatened to use state sovereignty to resist unpopular 
foreign policies. Gradually, the understanding of original intent as 
an objective, extra-textual means of determining the intent of the 
contracting states gave way to the view of original intent as the 
subjective, historical expectations of the framers. Newly available 
Convention materials contributed greatly to this shift in focus. The 
debate over states' rights continued, but the original intent of the 
contracting states had become "the original intent of the framers." 
In The Federalist No. 18, Madison pointed out that the central 
weakness in the Articles of Confederation was its contractual basis. 
By contrast, the proposed Constitution specifically rejected any 
contractual premise. In its place was an ordinance grounded in the 
power and will of the people. The Constitution and the central 
government it created embodied the will of the people and cast the 
states in a subordinate role to the federal government. 
To the early Federalists, the Constitution was more akin to a 
legislative proposal. From this perspective the framers served as a 
drafting committee that proposed legislation. Absent the people's 
power has been implied. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (power 
of judicial review); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (power over acts 
of Congress). 
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approval, these proposals lacked any intrinsic authority. The statu-
tory nature of the Constitution established the legal hierarchy so 
opposed by the Anti-Federalists, thereby subordinating state au-
thority. Hamilton wrote in The Federalist No. 78 that the federal 
government's superior authority compelled the federal judiciary to 
render invalid any contravening state act. 
This statutory model was the basis for the Federalist view that 
the Constitution was to be construed according to common law 
principles of statutory construction. This includes the expectation 
that the Constitution, like all legal documents, would be inter-
preted according to its express language. The meaning of the ex-
press language was to be ascertained in the common law judicial 
process of case-by-case interpretation. The Marshall Court empha-
sized the supremacy of the text, read against the preamble that 
articulated the purposes of the Constitution. The subjective intent 
of the drafters and ratifiers of the Constitution was irrelevant be-
cause they were merely conduits of the people's will. As Justice 
Brennan has pointed out, it is far more realistic to say that the 
meaning of the Constitution is the product of the interpretive pro-
cess rather than a static, subjective force locked into place at its 
inception. 
To accept the doctrine of original intent as it is espoused by Mr. 
Meese and others, one must perforce accept its contractual pre-
mise. The framers, however, explicitly rejected the contract theory. 
Instead, they drafted the Constitution in a manner that would 
avoid the pitfalls encountered under the Articles of Confederation. 
A historically accurate definition of "framers' intent" embodies 
this intention only. It does not venture into the elusive realm of 
the framers' subjective intentions because the framers never in-
tended their individual likes and dislikes to be used in constitu-
tional interpretation. The true intent of the framers can be found 
in the text of the Constitution as the words have been interpreted 
according to their plain meaning, the purposes behind the Consti-
tution, and the principles upon which those purposes rest. 
It is clear that the Constitution was not intended by the major-
ity of drafters and ratifiers to be a compact among states. None-
theless, debate on the issue, as old as the Constitution itself, rages 
on today. But I hesitate to label one result "intended" and another 
not because I risk falling into the same trap that the originalists 
have encountered. Original intent is a slippery term. Proponents 
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have tried to give it substance, and the results are varied to say the 
least.43 
As a general proposition, originalists believe that the historically 
demonstrable intent of the framers should be binding on contem-
porary interpreters of the Constitution. Such a jurisprudence of 
original intent would, in the Attorney General's words, "produce 
defensible principles of government that would not be tainted by 
ideological predeliction" as well as reflect "a deeply rooted com-
mitment to the idea of democracy." 
Once again, the threshold question is whose intent is original in-
tent? Dissenters from the doctrine point out that both the framers 
and drafters, as well as the ratifiers in the several states, failed to 
achieve a collective state of mind with respect to what the pro-
posed Constitution said or should have said. 
Furthermore, the Constitution and the American public under-
went dramatic changes in the years following the Civil War. These 
changes, especially as reflected in the Reconstruction Acts and the 
thirteenth and fourteenth amendments, illustrate how history it-
self affects the meaning of original intent. Eighteenth century 
views of the proper balance of state and federal power focused on 
the abuse of federal power. This changed dramatically with the 
adoption of the Civil War Amendments. The federal government 
became the bulwark of individual rights because states refused to 
enforce the rights of newly-freed slaves. Any discussion of original 
intent, therefore, must include not only the intent in 1787 but also 
that in 1867. 
Even if we accept the view that the meaning of the Constitution 
is derived from its words and the principles underlying these 
words, we are still faced with the question of the Constitution's 
fundamental character as it is perceived and debated today. Focus-
ing on the great principles behind the Constitution is more mean-
ingful than trying to divine subjective intentions. These are bed-
rock principles that two hundred years of interpreting and 
amending have not changed. They are principles necessarily em-
bodied in broad, often obscure language that requires interpreta-
tion. Interpreting sweeping constitutional language inevitably in-
volves to some degree the subjective value judgments of the 
43. Compare Meese, supra, note 40 with Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent and 
Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823 (1986). But see Brennan, supra, note 40. 
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interpreters. This is not to say that judges should be freewheeling 
in injecting their social consciences and values into constitutional 
adjudication."" It is to say that different judges will construe the 
same constitutional principle differently.0 
While perhaps disagreeing among themselves as to "proper" con-
stitutional meaning, there is no federal judge or justice who is not 
acutely aware of the nonrepresentative role he or she occupies. It is 
true that at times in its history, the Court seems to have substi-
tuted its own values in place of the legislature's, but such occur-
rences are rare.'8 The law itself further restrains federal judges' an-
alytical subjectivism through its institutional disciplines and 
practices that help ensure principled decision making. •1 
Finally, whatever interpretative view one may espouse, it is, as 
Charles Miller has written, reasoning that is the essential element 
in the judicial process. Political and philosophical differences are 
inevitable in a healthy democratic society. Critics of the Court like 
Attorney General Meese have the right and perhaps the duty to 
question the Court's interpretations of the Constitution. But a cri-
tique worth its salt must be grounded in accurate historical prem-
ises and must proceed from those premises to a reasoned conclu-
sion, acknowledging along the way the fallability of a subjective 
point of view. Whether Attorney General Meese has achieved this 
is the question left to determine. 
Justice Brennan offers an appropriate conclusion to this discus-
sion in his suggestion that we should ceaselessly embrace the con-
cept of human dignity as the core of our constitutional ideal." I 
44. L. TRIBE, supra note 40. 
45. C. MILLER, supra note 40, at 199-200. 
46. This depends of course on the political and philosophical position of the person as-
sessing the Court's holdings. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
47. There are many institutional restraints to which the federal judiciary must adhere. A 
threshold question of every federal case is jurisdiction. Parties must have standing to bring 
a justiciable issue before the court. The issue must be ripe. A moot issue will not be re-
viewed. Federal judges must also apply the principles of res judicata, collateral estoppel, 
abstention, exhaustion, and, of course, stare decisis. 
48. As we adapt our institutions to the ever-changing conditions of national and 
international life, those ideals of human dignity-liberty and justice for all indi-
viduals-will continue to inspire and guide us because they are entrenched in our 
Constitution. Thus, the Constitution with its Bill of Rights has a bright future, as 
well as a glorious past, for its spirit is inherent in the aspirations of our people. 
Brennan, supra note 40, at 16. 
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Denial of Certificate of 
Probable Cause and 
Dissolution of Order to 
Stay Execution of Sentence. 
Before LAY, 
Judges. 
Chief Judge, McMILLIAN and ARNOLD, Circuit 
LAY, Chief Judge. 
George Mercer was convicted of capital murder i n the 
state courts of Missouri and sentenced to death. The 
conviction and sentence were subsequently affirmed by the 
Supreme Court of Missouri, State v. Mercer, 618 S. W. 2d 1 
{Mo.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933 {1981), and Mercer was 
later denied relief in state post-conviction proceedings. 
Mercer v. State, 666 S.W.2d 942 {Mo. App. 1984). Thi s court 
affirmed the denial by the federal district court of his 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Mercer v. Armentrout, 
844 F.2d 582 {8th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 s. Ct. 249 (1988). 
Shortly after the Supreme Court of the United States denied 
certiorari, the Supreme Court of Missouri set October 20, 
1988, at 12:01 a.m., as the new date for execution of 
sentence. Mercer filed a second petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in the district court for the Western District 
of Missouri on October 13, 1988. The district court 
.. 
summarily dismissed this petition and denied Mercer's request 
for a stay of execution. Mercer v. Armentrout, No. 88-1019-
CV-W-5 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 18, 1988). An appeal was filed in this 
court and a motion to stay the execution was likewise filed. 
The motion was assigned to the original panel members who had 
passed on the first habeas case. The motion to stay the 
execution was temporarily granted because it was presented to 
the panel of this court at a time when court was in session 
and it was impossible for the three judges to adequately 
review the material prior to the designated time of the 
execution. Mercer v. Armentrout, No. 88-2547-WM (8th Cir. 
Oct. 19, 1988). 
Petitioner's second petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
raised several new issues relating to ineffective assistance 
of counsel. The court's preliminary concern was whether 
Mercer's new petition stated issues worthy of granting a 
certificate of probable cause. After studied analysis we 
have now determined that a certificate of probable cause 
should not issue in the present case. However, this is a 
capital case and the State has questioned certain procedural 
processes of this court in issuing our initial stay order. 
Accordingly, it is important to initially discuss standards 
concerning a federal court's review of motions to stay state 
warrants of execution. 
Human life is our most precious possession. Our natural 
instincts guide us from birth to sustain life by protecting 
ourselves and protecting others. All notions of mora 1 i ty 
focus on the right to live and all of man's laws seek to 
preserve this most important right. When presented with 
challenges to a capital sentence, it would be easy to respond 
rhetorically by asking, "what about the victim who the 
defendant has been found guilty of unmercifully killing." 
But this approach fails to reflect on the ideal that a 
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government founded by a moralistic and civilized society 
should not act as unmercifully as the defendant is accused of 
acting. If the original murder cannot be justified under 
man's laws, it is equally unlawful and inhumane to commit the 
same atrocity in the name of the state. What separates the 
unlawful killing by man and the lawful killing by the state 
are the legal barriers that exist to preserve the 
individual's constitutional rights and protect against the 
unlawful execution of a death sentence. If the law is not 
given strict adherence, then we as a society are just as 
guilty of a heinous crime as the condemned felon. It should 
thus be readily apparent that the legal process in a 
civilized society must not rush to judgment and thereafter 
rush to execute a person found guilty of taking the life of 
another. 
I. Granting Stay of Execution 
The initial point of inquiry in granting or denying a 
stay of execution in a death case must be whether the 
petition is frivolous. If the petition is not frivolous on 
its face, the very essence of this court's duty is to study 
and research the points raised. The severity and finality of 
the death penalty requires the utmost diligence and scrutiny 
of the court. In capital cases the law is uniquely complex 
and difficult to understand. No judge can digest, retain, or 
apply these principles to a voluminous state court record 
without reflective study and analysis. To suggest that a 
life or death decision can be made by simply reading a 
petition is to advocate dereliction of judicial duty. The 
penalty has already been rendered and approved by the highest 
court of the state in which the crime has been committed. 
However, as worthy as state courts may be, the state process 
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does not always ensure constitutional process. 1 Experience 
has long demonstrated that human judgment rendered through 
judicial process is not infallible. As long as federal 
habeas review exists, it is the duty of federal judges to 
make certain that an individual does not forfeit his life at 
the hands of the state unless the state process lawfully 
rendered the punishment, that it complied with federal 
constitutional standards, and that the defendant was 
furnished with competent and effective representation within 
the norms required by the sixth amendment. Regardless of how 
heinous the crime, no one may reasonably question that a 
predicate to carrying out a death sentence is careful review 
of the constitutionality of the defendant's conviction and 
sentence. 
The State is critical of our granting an emergency stay 
in this case. We reject this criticism because it advocates 
execution of a death sentence without this court's reflective 
1since its decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 
( 1972) , the Supreme Court has vacated the sentence, or has 
affirmed the vacation of sentence, in roughly half of the 
death penalty cases in which it has granted certiorari. See, 
~, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988); Maynard 
v. Cartwright, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988); Satterwhite v. Texas, 
108 S. Ct. 1792 (1988); Sumner v. Shuman, 107 S. Ct. 2716 
(1987); Booth v. Maryland, 107 s. ct. 2529 (1987); Gray v. 
Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 
137 (1987); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); Skipper 
v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986); Caldwell v. 
Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985); Enmund v. Florida, 458 
U.S. 782 (1982); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982}; 
Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981); Adams v. Texas, 
448 U.S. 38 (1980); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980); 
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 
U.S. 586 (1978); Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978); Coker v. 
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 
633 (1977); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977); Woodson 
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 {1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 
428 U.S. 325 {1976); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972); 
Stewart v. Massachusetts, 408 U.S. 845 ( 1972) ; Crampton v. 
Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 {1972). 
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study of the issues raised in this case. It is a far 
greater tragedy to permit an unlawful execution than to delay 
a state's death warrant a few weeks to ensure that an 
irreparable mistake does not occur. 
II. Repetitive Petitioning and Appointed Counsel 
The State urges that habeas petitioners may "abuse" the 
writ by filing repetitive or "successive" petitions. 2 It is 
often asserted that in death cases repetitive writs present 
motions to stay and that such procedural tactics are used to 
merely prolong the inevitable. Notwithstanding this 
possibility, "[t]he consequences of injustice -- loss of 
liberty and sometimes loss of life -- are far too great to 
permit the automatic application of an entire body of 
technical rules whose primary relevance lies in the area of 
civil litigation." Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24 
(1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Concerns for comity to a 
sovereign state and finality to its judgments do not outweigh 
the absolute need to protect against the deprivation of an 
individual's constitutional rights which might invalidate 
the capital sentence. 
2rt bears noting that the terms "successive petition" 
and "abuse of the writ" have different meanings: 
A "successive petition" raises grounds identical to 
those raised and rejected on the merits on a prior 
petition. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S., 
at 15-17. * * * The concept of "abuse of the 
writ" is founded on the equitable nature of habeas 
corpus. Thus, where a prisoner files a petition 
raising grounds that were available but not relied 
upon in a prior petition, or engages in other 
conduct that "disenti tle ( s] him to the relief he 
seeks," the federal court may dismiss the 
subsequent petition on the ground that the 
prisoner has abused the writ. Id., at 17-19. 
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 444 n.6 (1986). 
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The apparent question is whether there exists sufficient 
means within the framework of the law to prevent vexatious 
delay resulting from state prisoners who seek to abuse the 
writ. In considering this question, certain preliminary 
factors must be taken into account. First, it must be 
recognized that a convicted defendant sentenced to death will 
attempt to assert every means available to prevent his 
execution. The instinctive human desire to live accounts for 
the proliferation of petitions for writs and stays. Nothing 
short of a complete bar to such petitions will prevent their 
continued filings. 
Second, lawyers should not be faulted for their services 
to indigent condemned prisoners in attempting to set aside a 
capital sentence. Courts appoint lawyers to serve these 
prisoners to assure that no condemned person shall die by 
reason of an unconstitutional process. It is important to 
understand the serious nature of the voluntary service 
involved. The American Bar Association has .initiated, and 
the Judicial Conference of the United States has supported, 
the establishment of Death Penalty Resource Centers. The 
purpose of these Centers is to increase the availability of 
competent attorneys to review the state processes and assure 
competent and effective representation of individuals 
sentenced to death. This project is inspired by the fact 
that competent representation is difficult to secure. The 
scarcity of volunteers among lawyers is understandable 
considering the fact that the average time that a competent 
lawyer labors in post-conviction review of a single death 
sentence is approximately one-quarter of a lawyer's billable 
hours for one year. These lawyers receive 1 i ttle or no 
compensation for this service. 
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It is essential to remember that counsel is appointed to 
ensure the preservation of the defendant's constitutional 
rights and to make certain that unlawful executions do not 
occur. The procedural mechanism for reviewing these 
petitions must strive to promote these same principles. The 
federal judiciary must therefore take particular care in 
death penalty cases to give patient and thoughtful review of 
claims presented by petitioners through their appointed 
counsel. 
III. Procedural Barriers 
Once an initial petition for a writ of habeas corpus has 
been fully processed by a federal court, a state prisoner 
must comply with certain procedural prerequisites before 
obtaining subsequent federal review of any constitutional 
claims relating to his conviction or sentence. A fundamental 
requirement contained in these procedures is that a state 
prisoner must exhaust his state court remedies. However, 
this requirement is one which is generally difficult for the 
prisoner to comply with because most states, including 
Missouri, bar successive post-conviction petitions. Assuming 
a defendant has filed one state court post-conviction 
petition before filing a petition in federal court, the 
doctrine requiring exhaustion of an existing state court 
remedy becomes inappropriate in light of the fact that 
generally no state court remedy exists. 
The next procedural barrier a prisoner must confront is 
the rule which precludes federal review of issues if there 
has been a procedural default by the prisoner on those issues 
in the state court. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-87 
(1977). Thus a petitioner cannot assert a claim of 
constitutional error at trial if he did not contemporaneously 
object at trial. Furthermore, the petitioner cannot assert 
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claims of constitutional error on his appeal if the issue was 
omitted on the state court appeal. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 
527, 533 (1986). See also Stokes v. Armantrout, 851 F. 2d 
1085, 1092 ( 8th Cir. 1988) ( application of "cause and 
prejudice" rules in federal habeas proceeding when 
petitioner's counsel failed to raise constitutional claims in 
state post-conviction proceeding) . The procedural by-pass 
rule is said to promote finality and deference to the 
procedure of the state court. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. at 
533. 
Two exceptions exist, however, to the procedural by-pass 
rule. First, the existence of both "cause" and "prejudice" 
may excuse the procedural default in state court. Cause is 
an ill-defined term over which federal judges have debated. 
Generally, cause can be established if some extrinsic 
circumstances prevented counsel from raising the issue. The 
usual example is the emergence of a new principle of 
constitutional law previously unrecognized at the time of the 
state court proceeding. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 18 (198 4). 
Cause may also be established by a sixth amendment violation 
of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 
477 U.S. 365, 380-82 
668 (1984). 
(1986). 
See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 
Once cause is established, 
"actual" prejudice must be separately proven. See United 
States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 168 (1982); Engle v. Isaac, 
456 U.S. 107, 129 (1982). 
The other exception to Sykes now appears in Murray v. 
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) and Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 
527 (1986). The procedural default rule can be avoided if a 
fundamental miscarriage of justice has occurred where "the 
alleged error undermined the accuracy of the guilt or 
sentencing determination." Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. at 539. 
See also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496. 
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Before ineffective assistance of counsel may be used to 
obviate a state procedural by-pass rule, actual prejudice 
must be shown. This requires a demonstration of "a 
reasonable probability that, absent the (attorney's] errors, 
the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting 
guilt." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 695. In 
dealing with the prejudice portion of the cause and prejudice 
test under Sykes, the Supreme Court has clearly required a 
showing of actual prejudice as well as the demonstration of 
cause. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 495. See also Engle 
v. Isaac, 456 U.S. at 110. The terms in Sykes are therefore 
not dissimilar to Strickland's prejudice test for ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Cf. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 
at 167-68; Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977). 
Similarly, in Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986), the 
court observed that the "ends of justice" standard involved 
in review of successive petitions for a writ requires a 
showing of a constitutional claim with a colorable showing of 
factual innocence. Id. at 444-45 (citing Sanders v. United 
States, 373 U.S. at 15, 16-17). Although each of the tests 
relating to actual prejudice are raised in a different 
context or stage in presenting habeas claims, it is readily 
apparent that the same core concern pervades the ultimate 
requirement for a habeas petitioner to succeed. 3 
In a repetitive filing of a habeas petition of claims 
that have not been previously submitted, the petitioner faces 
the implicit barrier of a bevy of procedural by-pass rules. 
In the present case, for example, Mercer raises claims of 
3There are of course important distinctions implicit to 
the Court's rulings in Sykes and Strickland. However, for 
the reasons previously discussed regarding the developments 
of Sykes under Smith and Carrier, the concerns behind the 
ineffective assistance of counsel standard have become 
intertwined in the process of determining procedural bar. 
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ineffective assistance of trial counsel which he has not 
raised before in either his state or federal post-
conviction proceedings. Before we may review the merits of 
those claims, we must question whether there was cause and 
prejudice in his failure to raise these issues in his state 
post-conviction claims or his first federal habeas petition. 
Cf. Stokes v. Armentrout, 851 F.2d at 1092. This raises the 
question of whether his post-conviction counsel was 
ineffective and caused him prejudice in not previously 
raising the claim. See, e.g. , Gilmore v. Armentrout, Nos. 
88-1378 & 88-1517, slip op. at 4-5; Stokes v. Armentrout, 851 
F. 2d at 1092-96. Petitioner has made no showing that his 
first trial counsel in the state conviction proceeding or his 
trial counsel in the first habeas proceeding was ineffective 
under Strickland standards. Nor has petitioner demonstrated 
a fundamental miscarriage of justice to obviate the cause and 
prejudice standards. See Smith v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 539. 
IV. Certificate of Probable Cause 
The Supreme Court viewed the efficacy of procedural 
default only in cases "devoid" of a constitutional claim 
which "undermined the accuracy of the guilt or sentencing 
determination." 477 U.S. at 539. Because this is a capital 
case we nonetheless have reviewed his claims to refute any 
possibility that his constitutional claims are such that his 
guilt and sentencing determinations are prejudically 
undermined by his belated constitutional claims. To attain a 
certificate of probable cause, a petitioner must present 
constitutional claims that are at least debatable among 
reasonable jurists. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 
n.4 (1983). In his application, Mercer claims that the 
prosecution withheld mitigating evidence, the "depravity of 
mind" instruction was unconstitutional, and he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel in several particulars. 
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A. Prosecution Withheld Mitigation Evidence 
Mercer contends that the prosecution withheld evidence 
that the victim had engaged in the illegal use and sale of 
drugs. He argues that this evidence could prove that her 
death was caused by drugs or, in the alternative, by John 
Campbell with whom she associated due to her involvement with 
drugs. This argument cannot succeed. As the district court 
observed, the cause of death was disputed at trial. Mercer 
claimed that the medical report made on the victim's death 
was inconclusive and inconsistent. He further argued that 
John Campbell actually murdered the victim. Consequently, it 
cannot be urged that presentation of the evidence in question 
would have led to a theory or defense which had not been 
presented at trial. Moreover, while evidence that the victim 
used and distributed drugs might have supported these 
contentions, that support at best would have had minimal 
influence. The jury determined beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Mercer strangled the victim to death. Because there is 
ample evidence in the record to support the jury's finding, 
it would be unreasonable to conclude that presentation of the 
allegedly withheld evidence would have led to a different 
outcome. 
B. Depravity of Mind Instruction 
Mercer also contends that the depravity of mind 
instruction, provided to the jury on the issue of aggravating 
circumstances, was unconstitutionally vague. While the 
instruction has been previously reviewed and upheld on the 
basis of Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), he argues 
that the Supreme Court has recently redefined the law in this 
area. In Maynard v. Cartwright, 108 s. Ct. 1853 (1988), the 
Court held that the language ''especially heinous, atrocious, 
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or cruel" provided inadequate guidance for sentencing and 
was therefore unconstitutional. Id. at 1859. However, 
Cartwright 
expansion, 
is clearly an application, rather than an 
of Godfrey. Id. at 1858-59. The 
constitutionality of the Missouri instruction therefore 
remains intact. As required by Godfrey, the jury's 
determination on this issue was properly reviewed by the 
appellate court. State v. Mercer, 618 S. W. 2d at 10-11. 
Furthermore, the instruction required that in addition to 
outrageous or wanton and 
finding of depravity 
distinguishes the instant 
inhuman conduct, there must be a 
of mind. 4 This requirement 
case from Cartwright, in which the 
instruction only required a general finding that the murder 
was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. 115 Thus, the 
instruction, viewed in the light most favorable to Mercer's 
claim, did not undermine the accuracy of the sentencing 
determination. 
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Finally, Mercer raises a host of claims of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel in his second habeas petition. 
Mercer argues that these claims were not contained in the 
4The instruction reads "[i]n determining the punishment 
to be assessed against the defendant for the murder of Karen 
Keeton, you must first unanimously determine that ... the 
murder of Karen Keeton involved depravity of mind and that as 
a result thereof it was outrageously or wantonly vile and 
inhuman." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.012.2(7) (repealed). 
5rn any event, the issue of whether Cartwright alters 
the law as stated in Godfrey is immaterial since the jury 
also found an additional aggravating circumstance based on an 
agency theory. Mercer v. Armentrout, 844 F.2d at 584. 
Under Missouri law, a death sentence need not be vacated if 
only one of several aggravating circumstances is found 
deficient. Id. 
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initial petition because he was at that time still 
represented by trial counsel, Cenobio Lozano, who failed to 
allege ineffective assistance of counsel as the result of the 
obvious conflict of interest. However, assuming this to be 
true, upon review of the record, these claims do not in any 
way demonstrate a colorable showing of actual innocence or 
that the sentencing process was undermined. 
Mercer contends that counsel erred in failing to 
discover and present evidence relating to the victim's 
alleged illegal use and sale of drugs. Further, he asserts 
error in counsel's failure to present a forensic pathologist 
to testify regarding the condition of the victim's body. 6 
As previously stated, it is highly improbable that evidence 
of this sort would have changed the outcome of the trial. 
The failure to present such evidence was not sufficiently 
prejudicial to Mercer's case to find ineffective assistance 
of counsel. 
Mercer also alleges that counsel erred in recommending 
that he waive instructions on lesser included offenses, 
namely, the first degree murder and felony-murder 
instructions. The Missouri Court of Appeals found that 
Mercer and his counsel had expressly waived these 
instructions. Mercer v. State, 666 S.W.2d at 945-47. The 
trial transcript clearly demonstrates that Mercer on two 
separate occasions knowingly and willingly waived these 
instructions. No prejudice exists under these circumstances. 
6rt must be noted that counsel did present testimony 
from Charles Pottinger who, while not a forensic pathologist, 
is a technician with the Kansas City Police Department and 
capable of expert comment on the physical evidence in this 
case. 
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Finally, Mercer asserts that counsel erred in failing to 
develop and present evidence of mitigating circumstances. In 
particular, he argues that counsel should have pursued a 
theory of diminished capacity due to the consumption of 
alcohol. Al though there is evidence that indicates Mercer 
had consumed alcohol at the time of the murder, there is 
nothing in the record demonstrating that he was intoxicated. 
In fact, there is considerable evidence supporting the jury's 
conclusion that Mercer's conduct was performed in a sober and 
calculated manner. It is clear that Mercer was not 
prejudiced by counsel's decision not to pursue a defense 
based on alcohol consumption. It would be unreasonable to 
conclude that the presentation of this mitigation evidence, 
either during the trial or in the sentencing phase, would 
have altered Mercer's fate in these proceedings. 
Mercer's second petition for a writ of habeas corpus has 
failed to demonstrate any substantial claim which, if true, 
would have undermined the accuracy of the guilt or sentencing 
determination. A certificate of probable cause is denied and 
this court's previous order to stay execution of the sentence 
is ordered vacated. 
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'l'O MEMBERS OF THE AD BOC COJOUTTEB OH l'BDBRAL HABEAS 
CORPUS RBVIBW OP CAPITAL SEHTBRCBS 
Justice Powell has made excellent auqqestions and I 
have attempted to incorporate them in the proposed redraft. 
I have omitted the reference to the Federal Court Study 
ComJnittee draft report since I am advised the final report 
will take no position on any proposal, In the text of 
Justice Powell's "Rider A and Rider B," I have taken the 
editorial license he extended and deleted cites (which I 
don't expect Conference members to consult on readinq our 
otherwise informal comment), one sentence which I took to 
largely paraphrase the quote from Teague, and an adjective 
and adverb or two. I ha~e also added three sentencee to the 
final paragraph of the comment on successive petitions to 
reflect the statistical work just completed by Profeeaor 
Pearson. 
Would all of you take another look and qive me the 
benefit of your suggestions? 
Attachment 
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Justice Lewis F. Powell 
Judge William Terrell Hodges* 
Judge Paul H. Roney* 
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Professor Albert Pearson 
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SUPPLBMERTARY COMMBMT BY TBB AD BOC C())OCI'rrBB OH 
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS DI CAPITAL CASES--
THB P0NBLL COMMI'l'TEB REPORT 
003 
Since our report in September 1989, a number of 
comments, reports, suqgestione, and recommendations have 
been circulated. Senator Biden has introduced a bill 
addressing the subject, and the American Bar Association 
Task Force on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus has published its 
final report and diaaents. Recently, Chief Judge Lay and 
seven other members of the Judicial Conference have 
circulated a resolution proposing specific modifications of 
the Powell Committee report. 
The members of the Powell Committee have reviewed the 
committee report in light of these developments. We 




The following comments support this 
The o'\rerwhelming consensus of those who have studied 
the present eituation advocates changes that would address 
fundamental faults in the present procedures. The general 
criticism is that litigation takes too lonq and is 
repetitious. Perceptione differ, so do the theory and 
structure of proposed solutions. 
The Powell Committee report does not purport to cure 
-------"' 
all of the faults in all of the systems involved. Rather, -----------it recommends legislation designed to achieve a balanced 
compromise which would commit federal courts to a • inqle but '--- ---~----~...__'--_______________ ~---===~----
comprehensive and orderly district and appellate habeas 
roceeding deaiqned to assure fairness to the state 
--------





counsel for petitioners in etate collateral procedure. This)~ 
exchange is the heart of the committee proposal. It recoq- ~----- ~~ 
nizes that if a • tate is willing to furnish a petitioner 
~ 
competent counsel for state court poet-conviction proceed- ~ s+a:b. 
ings, those proceedings can provide really meaninqful ~ 
collateral review--a process now left almost entirely to 
federal habeas corpus. The committee recommendation 
provides an automa .... t i-c et~ of execution until all state -
collateral and federal habeae corpus proceedings are 
completed. A time limitation would replace the present uee 
~
of write of execution to keep litigation moving in the 
courts. The time limit would cut in half the average of one 
year now loet when no collateral proceedings are before any 
court. 
Habeas corpus reforms are frequently proposed, but 
seldom enacted. Unless proposed legislation balances the 
interests of the state and the defendant, it will have 
little or no chance of enactment. Our design proposes an 
opt-in compromise. States mu15t voluntarily implement and 
~
fund a program providing competent counsel and li tig-ation 
costs which is not constitutionally compelled. The 
8 84905271 CJ CHAS CLARK 02/ 28/90 15:44 005 
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proposals advanced by other/' u)would mandate counsel 
standarda~ ake away prese~ procedural rights~ nd overrule 
A ~ ✓~J W~1L...:/--
8Xi&ting Supreme Court precedenr.-- Impositig Uiese · l>urdans 
will probably nullify any hope of enactment and, if enacted, 
such legislation would surely attract no state cooperation. 
In either event, present faults would continue to plague the r 
process. 
The most significant areas of difference between our 
committee report and other proposals are: 
Counsel Standards. The Powell Committee recommendation 
provides that states which opt in would have to •et stand-
ards under a court or legislative plan which must result in 
the appointment of competent counsel. The Biden Bil 1 and 
Judge Lay's group would mandate states follow the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Standards; the ABA Task Force adopts the much more 
complex ABA Guidelines for appointment and qualification of 
counsel. Both the ABA Task Force and Judge Lay' a group 
require the mandatory standards for trial, direct appeal, 
and collateral proceedings. 
Comment: The Powell CoJl'lll\ittee approach 
leaves counsel standards to individual states but 
keeps the .ultimate question of competency in the 
hands of the federal courts. If the procedures a 
state adopts for appointing counsel are not valid, 
the guidelines and time limits do not take effect. 
Rather than saddle the defendant with counsel who 
would meet some pre-fixed requirement but miqht 
not be competent otherwiee, t_h.e Comm__J.ttee 
recommends this be left to communit stanoards and 
ju a eve opment. Leg is at.1.on ha.a not been 
necessary to implement the constitutional 
definition of "effective assistance of counsel," 
and it would be counterproductive here. Timea 
change more often than statutes, and a defendant 
is entitled to counsel that meets current notions 
of competency. Experience has shown that capital 
defendants often receive excellent representation 
by counsel who might not fit the ABA or proposed 
druq atatute standards. 
we note that Ju~ge \ ax 's~ i roup abandon& the 
Powell Committee's opt- n" approach, in which 
states qain in finality in return for providinq 
counsel. Instead, these propoaals make atate 
habeas e dato in all caees under 
pena y of removing procedural default and 
exhaustion rules and eliminating the presumption 
of correctness of state court factfindin9. These 
proposals would create a new riqht of "effective 
assistance" in state collateral proceedings to be 
litigated case-by-case. This would result in 
increased litigation. 
Down Ti.me. The Powell CoJJ'IJllittee requires that a 
federal petition be filed within 180 days of appointment of 
counsel, but this period is tolled whenever the case ia in 
state court, and may be supplemented by 60 days for qood 
cause. The ABA and Biden proposale would allow counsel to 
stay out of court 365 days plus 90 days. Judqe Lay's group 
recommends not only doubling the time, but also not starting 
to measure it until after all state collateral proceedinqa 
are complete. When thi• recommendation is coupled with the 
automatic stay of execution, a defendant's counsel could 
stay out of court indefinitely. 
Comment I Case etudies show that allowinq 
counsel to stay out of court for one year would 
not shorten pre1Sant delays. In practice, 
petitions are sometimes required to be filed in a 
matter of days, or weeks, when an execution date 
has been set. One hundred eighty days is mnple. 
That is the time approved by the Judicial 
A 
Conference in 1974. Bxperiance provea the wi• dom 
of that decision. The same counsel eervee the 
defendant in both 1State collateral and federal 
habeas. No re-education or atudy ia needed. 
Since the propo• al contemplates full litigation of 
all issues in • tate court, the move by the same 
counsel from etate to federal court • hould not 
involve any major problem in investigation, 
preparation and drafting. Once the petition ia 
filed in federal court, the limitation end• • 
Retroactivity. The Ad Hoc Commit tee Report doei, not 
alter present law with respect to the retroactivity of new 
rules of criminal law. The Biden Bill, the ABA Tai,k Force, 
and Judge Lay's group propose overruling Supreme Court 
precedent to make retroactivity rul_!e more favorable to 
petitioners. 
Comment • Under the recent Supreme Court 
decision in Teag ue v. Lane, a 'hcrw~rule of criminal 
procedure will not be applie_ retroactively on 
federal habeas unless t he new rul e places an 
entire category of conduct of defendants beyond 
the reach of the law, or the new rule is •implicit 
in ordered liberty." Thie current retroactivity 
law reflects that federal habeas corpus should 
serve as a vehicle to correct errors in state 
judgments. The Powell Committee ia of the view 
that retroa.ctivity should not create a forum to 
argue for new rules of law, which would then be 
applied to overturn state court judgment& that 
were correct at the time they were decided. The 
supreme Court stated in Teagues "Application of 
constitutional rules not in existence at the time 
a conviction became final seriously undennines the 
principle of finality which is essential to the 
operation of our criminal justice system." 
Retroactivity la an area that has been 
traditionally handled by the courts, not by 
legislation. The proposed statutory changee in 
retroactivity under the Biden, ABA, and Lay 
proposals will worsen the present situation with 
respect to finality and federal state relations in 
the area of capital habeas corpus without any gain 
in fairness. 
s 
Procedural Default. The Ad Hoc Committee Report does 
not propose any alteration of the present law with respect 
W ~ IJ-to pr~ ult ~ iden, ABA, and Lay proposals, 
however, propose dramatic alteration of this entire area of 
_______________ 
the law. 
Comment. The Biden, ABA, and Lay proposals 
would, under various fonnulations, require that 
federal courts i nore state procedural efault 
rules ,. any time t e ai ure to ra se a claim was 
du e to "ignorance or neglect" of the prisoner or 
counsel. These proposals wouJ d overrule by 
legislation Wainwri ght v. Sykes and case• that 
follow it. St ate proceaurar default rules serve 
the valid purpQee of re irin ob ections to be 
raised a r a, wen corrective measures can be 
taken, not year• later in a federal habeas 
petition. The change advocated by the Biden, ABA, 
and Lay proposals would promote, not lessen, 
piecemeal litigation. Addition of this proviaion 
to any reform package woul d make its passage lees 
likely and eliminate any incentive for the states 
to eupport it. 
Successive Habeas Corpus Petitions. The Powell 
Committee would permit successive federal liti9ation only 
(1) as a result of state action in violation of the 
Constitution, or (2) when the Supreme Court has announced a 
new retroactive right, or (3) when new fact• are alleged 
which could not have been discovered earlierJ and the 
allegations would undermine the court 'a confidence in the 
jury's determination of guilt of the capital offenBe. The 
Biden Bill and ABA Task Force would, in addition, permit a 
successive petition on any new leqal predicate by allowinq 
successive petitions "if necessary to prevent a miscarriage 
r 
. . 
of justice, 11 Judge Lay's group would allow eucceasiva 
petitions on all of these aame grounds plua allowing 
petitioner to attack the appropriateness of the aentence. 
Comments In effect, the Powell Committee 
propoBal would limit the "miscarriage of juatice" 
concept to preventing a state from executing a 
defendant who could show fact• which would 
undermine the court' a confidence in the jury'• 
determination of guilt of the capital offense. 
The general "miscarriage of justice" standard 
finds its definition so largely in the eye of the 
beholder rather than in accepted legal principles 
as to forfeit the measure of federal finality the 
committee's proposed compromi• e needs. To broaden 
this exception to finality with the Lay group'a 
words II to undermine the court ' • confidence . • • 
in the appropriateness of the sentence of deathM 
would open the door even wider to repeti tioue 
litigation. These appear to be new word.a in the 
federal law of habeaa corpus , The committee is 
unaware of any decision which permits a federal 
court to grant constitutional relief from a state 
death sentence on the ground that the court doea 
not have confidence that the sentence is 
"appropriate." The recommendation does not 
reflect whether the federal court would apply a 
state or federal • tandard of "inappropriatenesa," 
but the inference ie that a federal atandard would 
be used. 
A review of every one of the 677 federal 
habeas corpus cases decided aince 1967 that 
involved the death penalty reveals only S cases 
which on a successive petition resulted in relief 
as to the sentence. None involved Brady material. 
All 5 concerned matters of record which could and 
should have been raised in prior proceedings. In 
the hypothetical instance where a constitutional 
claim af fectinq the sentences waan' t discovered 
until fully coun1Seled state and federal 
proceedings had been exhausted, it can still be 
presented in state court. 
The Powell Committee proposal is neither for nor 
against the death penalty. Ite sole aim is to improve the 
•' ' . 
process of federal habeae corpus by proposing a legi• lative 
compromise that has a realistic chance of being adopted and 
implemented. We continue to believe that the Powell 
Committee report in its present form holds the best promise 
to eliminate the faults that now hamper the righte of all. 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE AD HOC COMMI'ITEE ON HABEAS CORPUS 
REVIEW OF CAPITAL SENTENCES 
I have just received and am transmitting for your consideration the 
attached letter from Presiding Judge Walter C. Kurtz of the State of 
Tennessee Trial Courts in Nashville, submitting a statement of his views as 




cc: Professor Albert M. Pearson 
i 
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The Judicial Conference 




NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE 37201 
March 15, 1989 
Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus 
Review of Capital Sentences 
C/O William R. Burchill, Jr. 
Administrative Office, U.S. Courts 
811 Vermont Avenue NW 
Washington, DC 20544 
Dear Ms./Sir: 
CIRCUIT. CRIMINAL 
AND CHANCERY COURlS 
20TH JUDICIAL OISl RI CT 
I am writing to you in my capacity as presiding judge of the 
state trial courts here in Nashville as well as a judge who 
presides day in and day out over criminal trials. 
I have given considerable thought over the last several 
years to the crisis that has developed regarding collateral 
attacks on criminal convictions. I would like to present for 
youT consideration a proposal which would curtail federal habeas 
corpus review of state convictions, but which would strike a 
balance between the need to protect the rights of criminal 
defendants and the need to expedite the appellate process 
subsequent to criminal conviction. 
At present almost all states provide, in addition to direct 
appeals, post conviction procedures allowing a criminal defendant 
an opportunity to collaterally attack a conviction if there are 
alleged constitutional violations during the initial trial 
proceedings. Upon exhaustion of state post conviction 
proceedings, the defendants have the opportunity to go to the 
federal district court on federal habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. 2254), 
and from the decision of the federal district judge to appeal to 
the court of appeals. Thus a criminal defendant can have his 
conviction reviewed on direct appeal in the state system; then 
through post conviction proceedings in the state system; and then 
a full review by the federal courts through the use of federal 
habeas corpus. This procedure leads to a great duplication of 
judicial effort as well as a considerable delay in the final 
outcome of the criminal proceeding. I believe that the proposal 
that I suggest will strike a balance between the concerns of 
Congress and the executive branch to insure that federal 
constitutional rights are protected, and the rights of the public 
and the states to see that there is a speedy disposition of 
criminal cases. It is also more consistent with generally 
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accepted principles of federalism. I propose as follows: 
A. A criminal conviction obtained in a state which has an 
appropriate and effective post conviction proceeding shall be 
exempt from review in the federal district courts under 28 U.S.C. 
2254. The state post conviction proceeding, however, will have 
to meet minimum standards of fairness as set forth in federal 
legislation that would amend 28 U.S.C. 2254. 
B. A decision of the state trial judge on post conviction 
proceeding after hearing would be appealable to the state 
appellate courts. Once the state appellate courts have rendered 
a final decision, discretionary review could be requested in the 
federal court of appeals for that state. In other words, from 
the highest state appellate court there would be direct discre-
tionary review to the federal court of appeals on all state post 
conviction cases. The denial of discretionary review by the 
federal court of appeals would likewise be subject to discre-
tionary review by the Supreme Court of the United States. 
C. The State would be required to appoint competent counsel 
to represent indigent criminal defendants in state post convic-
tion proceedings. The appointed attorney would be required to 
represent the petitioner at least through the application for 
discretionary review to the federal court of appeals. 
It seems to me that the above proposal is simple and direct 
and strikes a proper balance between speed in the appellate 
process and the need to protect federal constitutional rights of 
defendants while accomplishing the following: 
1. It continues to allow for effective review in the federal 
courts of state court decisions related to the enforcement of 
federal constitutional rights, while at the same time prohibiting 
the offensive practice of having one federal district judge 
essentially reverse the decision of the highest court of the 
state. 
2. It stops the further flow of power from the states to the 
federal district courts and would increase the regard and 
responsibility of the state courts. 
3. It will speed the appellate process and stop the 
duplication of effort which presently exists when federal habeas 
corpus review is available after state post conviction remedies 
have been exhausted. 
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I submit this proposal for your serious consideration. 
WCK/lb 
